Mutual Funds as Investors of Large Pools of Money by Mundheim, Robert H.
1967]
MUTUAL FUNDS AS INVESTORS OF
LARGE POOLS OF MONEY
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR ROBERT H. MuNDIHrEim: Good morning and welcome
to the University of Pennsylvania Conference on Mutual Funds.
One of the most striking things about the mutual fund industry
is the phenomenal speed with which it has grown. It is its growth in
size and maturity which raises questions with respect to the present
adequacy of a regulatory framework designed in 1940 to govern a
half-billion dollar industry-roughly one-eightieth of the size of the
industry today.
The Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds' and the Com-
mission's Report of the Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth' have been the major studies which attempt to
identify the problems which such growth has created. The material
and analysis in these studies will figure prominently in our discussions
today and tomorrow.
I am delighted that so many of you have come here, many of you
from quite far off places (including one from London), to think for
two days about the vital issues which confront the industry. Some
concern has been expressed that any discussion of these issues should
appropriately be reserved for Congressional hearings on Commission-
proposed legislation.a I disagree with those who hold that view. I
think that a great deal of benefit can emerge from public discussion
and analysis of the issues prior to any Congressional hearings. I think
that such discussion should assure Congress of more thoughtful and
complete presentations at its hearings. It also gives various people,
like yourselves, who are interested in the mutual fund industry an
opportunity to learn what the Commission is trying to do, and gives
the Commission a further opportunity to understand the impact of
some of its proposals.
It is in this spirit of exchange of views and amplification of
positions that this Conference was organized. It was not organized
to provide an arena for verbal battles about fixed positions.
1 Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton Report].
2 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Public Policy Implications of Investment Com-
pany Growth, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cing., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SEC Mutual Fund Report].
3 The Commission's proposals are found in S. 1659, H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
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I hope that this Conference will serve an educational function-
in its broadest sense. In that connection, I want to remind you that
each panelist is here in his individual capacity. He does not purport
to speak for the organization which employs him. The views he
expresses are his own.
In addition, you should bear in mind that the Commission's report
has been publicly available for only two months. That is a relatively
short time. Consequently, in many areas firm conclusions may not
have been reached with respect to the need for changes in the regu-
latory framework or, if need for change is thought desirable, concrete
alternatives to the changes recommended by the Commission may not
have been developed yet.
As I indicated before, the Commission's report occupies the center
of any discussion of the problems facing the mutual fund industry. I
think, therefore, it may be appropriate to begin by asking you, Com-
missioner Wheat, to tell us how the report came into being.
Background of the SEC's Report
COMMISSIONER FRANcis M. WHEAT: The program of this Con-
ference, the fact that it could be held at all, testifies to the great ad-
vantage of our free society. The beneficial effect of an atmosphere
which promotes a free interchange of ideas is no better evidenced than
in a situation like the one we have here.
There may be a few differences that will come to light during
the Conference, but the three of us here from the Commission hope
most of you will look on this as an opportunity to explore, rather than
to debate. I am glad to hear from Bob that such is the spirit of
this Conference.
We expect, in view of the talent and experience of our fellow
panelists, to carry back to Washington some valuable insights. For
our part, we will try to explain what lies behind the recommendations
in the Commission's report which are relevant to the topics of the
Conference. If misconceptions exist regarding many of these recom-
mendations-and I think there are a few-it will be our job to try
to clear them up.
With these as our objectives, perhaps you will forgive us if we
do not try to answer, toe to toe, all of the arguments against the
report's conclusions which our skillful friends in the industry un-
doubtedly can muster.
And let me add the usual official disclaimer. to the extent that
any of us are led to express our own ideas, you must remember that
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our colleagues at the Commission are entitled to regard them as
pure heresy.
Most of you are thoroughly familiar with the background of the
Commission's report. Perhaps of interest is the fact that it is the
outgrowth of the efforts of three groups of people. The Wharton
School, which made the basic study, delivered its results to the
Commission and to the public in 1962. The Special Study of the
Securities Markets, prepared by a group of men whose unique relation
to the Commission might be described as within yet apart, covered
other aspects of the industry in a portion of its report to the Com-
mission in 1963. The third group consisted of the Commission's own
staff. Perhaps the most important observation I could make, however,
is that the report is very much the product of a painstaking, con-
scientious effort by all the Commissioners. It is not simply the product
of the staff, given official imprimatur by the Commission.
The Commissioners are men of widely different backgrounds.
This made for a good deal of give and take in the long sessions we
held to probe and dissect each of the alternative approaches to the
problems we examined. Many parts of the report took shape very
slowly, with repeated and detailed drafting recommendations from the
individual Commissioners. The staff was left to derive small comfort
from the fact that Plato, according to the story, rewrote the first
paragraph of The Republic twelve times.
The Commission's Objectives
The report has been given-what should I say?-a varied re-
ception. Some have told us that we did not go far enough. The
reaction of some others reminds me of a certain Duke of Cambridge in
the eighteenth century, who is alleged to have said: "Any change of
any kind at any time for any purpose is to be deplored."
There are some, I am afraid, who may have seriously miscon-
strued our recommendations. Let me comment briefly on one trouble-
some misconstruction.
It has been said that the Commission seeks to subject the invest-
ment companies to public utility-type rate regulation. Nothing could
be further from the fact. As to the management fees charged by the
external advisory firms, the public utility concept of fair return on
prudent investment would be wholly inapplicable. What the Com-
mission seeks is an appropriate and meaningful standard of fiduciary
responsibility in an area where arm's length bargaining over charges
is simply not possible.
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On the subject of sales load, the suggestion is that a maximum be
fixed, as was done by statute in 1940 for front-end loads. This is
hardly rate-making in any commonly understood sense. The reason
why this recommendation was made, in lieu of a recommendation that
the statute be amended to permit free competition among dealers as
to the load charged in connection with the sale of mutual fund shares,
will, I'm sure, be the subject of a lively discussion. Let me say,
however, that this recommendation and a number of others in the
report share a common thread. It is a thread which serves in a
broad sense to tie together many of the provisions of the existing
securities laws.
Our objective is to keep the securities markets and the choices
open to investors as free as possible from potential distortion from
any cause. Such distortion can come from lack of available or
adequate information about companies whose shares are publicly
sold-hence the need for the registration and reporting requirements
of the 1933 ' and 1934 5 Acts. It can, of course, come from fraud
practiced on the investor-hence the anti-fraud provisions. It can
arise from market manipulation. And, finally, as the report observes,
it can develop when enormous disparities exist in the incentives which
salesmen have to sell different kinds of securities.
The ultimate objective of fair and orderly markets for securities
which are deserving of public confidence is one, I think, we all share.
No one questions the increasing importance of investment companies
in the securities markets. Their amazing growth and popularity
invited the attention which they are receiving here and elsewhere. I
for one look forward with the keenest interest to the proceedings
which have begun this morning.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: When are these recommendations going
to be translated into legislative proposals? When is Congress going
to hold hearings on the proposals?
COMMISSIONER WHEAT: I can't give you any meaningful guess
as to either question. I would hope that there would be hearings
later this spring. I think in the relatively near future the Commission
will complete its work on a draft bill to the Congress and submit it-
but as to any real timetable, I'm afraid I could not give you an
answer.
4 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78hh (1964).
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MUTUAL FUND INFLUENCE OVER PORTFOLIO COMPANIES-
THE MUTUAL FUND AS A SHAREHOLDER
PROFESSOR MUNDHIEIM: In its discussion of the tremendous
growth of the mutual fund industry, the Commission also describes
and focuses on the rate of growth of individual funds and fund com-
plexes, and contrasts it, interestingly, with the concentration of fund
holdings in a relatively small number of stocks. Indeed, although the
total assets of the three largest funds more than doubled between 1958
and 1964, the number of stocks carried in their portfolios decreased
substantially.
One of the questions raised by the growing size of individual
holdings is the extent to which the management of mutual funds
has a right or a responsibility to influence the management of its
portfolio companies. I was told at a conference held at Duke Law
School' two years ago that this question is an academic one. How-
ever, it now appears to be raised in a very concrete and urgent way in
Senator Sparkman's letter 7 to the six funds which hold roughly 20
per cent of the stock of MGM, a company currently the subject of
a proxy dispute.
Professor Baum has given a great deal of attention to the rights
and responsibilities that institutional investors should exercise with
respect to their portfolio companies. Some of those thoughts are
articulated in his book, The Silent Partners,8 which I heartily com-
mend to all of you.
Professor Baum, do you think the Commission gave the problem
of investment company control of portfolio companies sufficient atten-
tion? Are there any recommendations which you would have made
in this area had you written this report?
PROFESSOR DANIEL J. BAUM: The special report on mutual funds
comes not from the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
but from the Commission itself, a body consisting of five individuals,
each with his own values, and his own interpretation of the admittedly
complex facts. In such a context the report should not be condemned,
but praised. It has both integrity and vigor. Yet this should not
deter us from inquiring into the state of the industry and asking the
questions Congress intended.
G Duxa UNrVE~srrY SCHOOL OF LAW, CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
145 (Mundheim ed. 1965). The remarks were those of Gordon D. Henderson.
7 See Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1967, p. 3, col. 2. Senator Sparkman
queried the six about the policy they followed in proxy contests and whether they
thought the Senate Banking and Currency Committee should consider legislation
covering these situations.
8 BAUM & STILES, THE SILENT PARNERS: INSTrUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CoR-
PORATE CONTROL (1965).
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The report is lacking in the attention given to and the recom-
mendations made concerning the problem of mutual fund control over
portfolio companies. Consider some of the facts presented in the
report: decision-making in the mutual fund industry is highly con-
centrated; eight advisory organizations control about half the in-
dustry's assets; " moreover, the monies flowing to the funds are
invested, it appears, in an ever-decreasing number of issues."0 This is
nowhere better illustrated than in the aerospace industry. Seventy-eight
investment companies, representing about two-thirds of the assets
of all investment companies, held more than 10 per cent of the out-
standing common stock of five major aerospace organizations."
The Argument That Mutual Funds Are Locked In
Because of market rigidity brought about by the growth and subse-
quent concentration of other institutional investors and because of
size, the giants of the mutual fund industry find themselves in a
position where they can neither buy nor sell as their best business
judgment dictates.
Essentially, they are locked into a number of issues. The Com-
mission noted all this in its report, yet recommended no "major new
legislation." Rather, the Commission urged that the informational
gap be closed "with respect to pension funds and other institutional
investors through amendments to existing Federal regulatory statutes
and through other appropriate means." '
I do not believe the Commission's recommendations reflect the
conclusions that the facts command. The Commission neglected the
opportunity presented to develop a recommendation it made at the
time the Investment Company Act of 1940 was first considered:
Investment companies may serve the useful role of repre-
sentatives of the great number of inarticulate and ineffective
individual investors in industrial corporations in which invest-
ment companies are also interested. Throughout the course of
the existence of such industrial corporations, various prob-
lems are presented to their stockholders which require a
degree of knowledge of financial and management practices
not possessed by the average stockholder. Investment com-
panies by virtue of their research facilities and specialized
personnel are not only in a position to adequately appraise
these situations but also have the financial means to make
their support or opposition effective. These investment com-
9 SEC Mutual Fund Report 48.
'oId. at 291-98.
11 Id. at 293.
121d. at 303.
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panies can perform the function of sophisticated investors,
disassociated from the management of their portfolio com-
panies. They can appraise the activities of the management
critically and expertly, and in that manner not only serve
their own interests but the interests of the other public
stockholders."3
Obligations of a "Locked In" Fund
On two grounds the funds argue against exercising influence
over portfolio management. (1) The funds seldom possess sufficient
shares individually in any corporation to exercise control. (2) The
funds frequently buy management. If they don't like management,
they sell. On both points the argument fails. (1) The ability to
influence portfolio management is not necessarily related to the vote,
although the report was not without examples of funds in de facto
control positions. Portfolio management is vulnerable to the influence
of a powerful institutional investor because it cherishes the benefits
that may come to a corporation from long-term institutional invest-
ment. (2) Grant that funds buy management. Are we to assume
that on the first mistake by that management the funds will sell? Does
portfolio management change character so quickly? Can't the funds
take steps to make a good investment better?
How curious is the argument of the funds. It hardly can be
harmonized with the statements of some fund managers that there
are occasions when fund views are made known to portfolio manage-
ment. And, more important, the argument certainly cannot be applied
to those funds which are locked into portfolio corporations. By
definition the realistic option of selling may not be open.
Specific content should be given the term "locked in." For pur-
poses of this discussion it will suffice to say that a fund is locked
into a given issue if it cannot sell with relative ease and without sub-
stantial loss. To the extent that funds are locked into a portfolio
corporation they share a community of interest with all other share-
holders of that corporation. In legal contemplation, viewed purely
in terms of managing other people's money, the funds should be
under an obligation to protect their investment by checking portfolio
management.
The suggestion is not radical. Funds already have demonstrated
their ability to act. They have challenged a corporate decision to
issue nonvoting stock where the result might have been delisting of
that corporation's stock.'4 For a variety of reasons they have raised
'3 Id. at 310.
14 United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., CCH 1961-64 FE. SEc. L. RI.
91288 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963).
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questions about proposed mergers, stock option plans, and pension
programs.'6 And, where given the opportunity afforded by a proxy
fight, like that which rocked Montgomery Ward, they have assisted in
forming a new management team.' 6
Suggestion for Limiting Mutual Fund Lock-ins
On fund control over portfolio corporations, alternative recom-
mendations should be considered. If funds are locked into an issue,
they should be compelled to exercise their influence over portfolio
management for the benefit of all shareholders of the portfolio cor-
poration. If we take the position that funds should not be locked
into an issue, that this is not good investment policy, then certain
conclusions may follow: perhaps limitations should be imposed on
the amount of any single issue that fund complexes, not just indi-
vidual funds, might acquire. The limitations would relate not to
outstanding stock, but rather to trading volume.
The choice of alternatives, in some measure, will be determined
by that which will result in the better investment policy. I believe
that purchase for long-term holding, as contrasted to purchase for
trading, generally is the better investment policy. However, this is
a proposition which I understand Dr. Friend will develop.
The Dilemma of the Funds
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Fred, you have been busily scribbling
notes. What bothers you about Professor Baum's comments?
MR. FRED E. BROWN: I think my problem is that I would like
to make a talk in reverse. It seems to me that mutual funds are
caught in the middle of a great many things. One of these relates to
what we are supposed to do in this great area of influencing manage-
ment. On the one hand, if we say we will sell if a company in which
we have an investment develops problems, we are told that this is
bad. We are told that we have a responsibility to hang on and try
to influence corporate managers to bring about improvement for the
benefit of the investment community at large. On the other hand, we
are told that if we try to influence corporate managers, if we try to
use the presumed power of our investment holdings, this is bad.
So there is some problem here. I think it would help us all
if Dan Baum and others interested in us would devote more time to
the definition of this problem, to pinning it down, before attempting
15 See Durm UNWmmsrry" SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 6, at 215-17.
16 BAUM & STILES, supra note 8, at 69-72.
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to solve it. And I would hope that in the process they would keep
in mind our responsibilities to our own stockholders.
Argument That the Funds Are Not Locked In
Now, there is an assumption in what Dan has said that we can't
sell our investment holdings, that we get locked in. I don't believe
this assumption holds water. There is an old principle in the financial
business that if you put enough commission on a security-and maybe
this is what the SEC is saying about mutual funds-you can sell it.
There are methods of doing this. There are methods of handling
large blocks of stock. Time after time secondary offerings are made,
and successfully made, which exceed the size of the holdings of most,
if not all, mutual funds. So I really don't think that being locked in
is the problem that Dan and others have suggested it is.
Objections to the Suggestion for Limiting Fund Lock-ins
Let me turn to the suggestion that the Commission impose limits,
related to trading volume, on the amount of stock of any issue which
a fund would be allowed to hold. I think such action would place
the Commission in the area of management, which so far it wisely--
in my opinion-has avoided.
In addition, implementation of such a suggestion raises a number
of problems. To take one example, it would be very difficult to deter-
mine the trading volume. How do we figure it? Do we take volume on
the New York Stock Exchange at any given time in a given stock? The
volume traded on the New York Stock Exchange may be only a frac-
tion of the total actually traded. Frank Weeden may be making a
large and an active market at that particular time. There might be
markets elsewhere. How would we know?
So this is another area where I feel very strongly that we are
talking about problems, and trying to cure problems, before we know
what the problems are.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Are you also suggesting, Fred, that
there are other ways for funds to get locked into investments, and
generally, we should look at it as a responsibility of an investment
manager not to get into the position where, for one reason or another,
it becomes difficult for him to get out?
MR. BROWN: It is a manager's business not to get locked in to
the point where he can't get out. We are talking about mutual funds.
Mutual funds hold out the right of redemption. How can you operate
678 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
consistently with the right of redemption you have set forth in your
prospectus, if you permit yourself to get locked into investments to
any material extent? You can't.
I would add one thing. I don't think a loss locks in a mutual
fund. Dan referred to getting out without a loss. I don't think this is
a significant consideration.
Adequacy of Markets To Handle Fund Portfolio Needs
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Walter?
MR. WALTER N. FRANK: I would like to add a little bit to Fred's
comment. I don't want anyone here to feel, because the expression
"locked in" has been used, that it is axiomatic, and that it's the gospel
truth. I think auction markets and the methods of distribution that
have been developed could handle almost any size distribution (even
at times when we have to include my competitor, Mr. Frank Weeden).
I remember when the Ford Foundation sold two million shares
at one particular time, and I don't believe there is a fund that has
a position of two million shares in any issue. I think you should
forget the thought that you are locked in because of the inadequacy of
markets and the inadequacy of distribution process.
MR. BROWN: I don't want to talk too much, but there's one other
thing I would like to mention, and that is the ebb and flow of investor
sentiment and psychology in the stock market. I'm going back to
this idea of limiting fund investments to a percentage of the trading
volume.
All of us know that markets change with the times, with condi-
tions, with sentiment and psychology. What may be a good market
in one stock under particular conditions may become a relatively poor
market in times when the particular stock is out of style or favor.
Within the last year the cement stocks have provided an example.
For a long, long time you couldn't have given one away. In the last
month or two they have done quite well in the market and their
trading volume has picked up substantially. We are working on
shifting sands and you can't set a sensible percentage limit. You
can't be so precise about this business.
Therefore it seems to me that the size of individual mutual fund
investments must be a matter of management judgment. That judg-
ment involves the exercise of a great deal of skill and experience in
handling blocks of stock and in moving out of securities without inter-
fering with existing markets.
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PROFESSOR MUNDIIEIM: Frank?
COMMISSIONER WHEAT: I have been listening to everything Mr.
Brown said and it is comforting. It gives me a chance to add the
comment that we thought we were preparing a conservative report.
We eschewed recommendations where we didn't think we had a large
body of information and a strong basis for them, and in the area that
Dan Baum has discussed, we felt that we did not have the kind of
data which would be necessary to make any positive recommendation
at this time.
We made some careful studies, as those of you who have read the
report know. We recognize the fact that when a large fund has to
dispose of a large block, it frequently does so in a secondary dis-
tribution of the type that Fred mentioned, at a commission charge
which may be two, three or four times the normal New York Stock
Exchange commission charge.17 Perhaps a very small fund would not
incur the expense of such a disposition.
On the other hand, comparing the performance of the very large
funds and fund complexes with those of the smaller funds that don't
have this problem, we did not find any marked or significant disparity.
This would tend to indicate that a locked-in situation has produced
little serious harm-or any harm, really-to investors as a whole.
Our general philosophy, if I can make a personal comment on it,
would be to try to follow the policy of encouraging the development
of strong securities markets, allowing maximum freedom in handling
portfolio transactions, rather than to try to think in terms of re-
strictions. In contrast, the commodity exchange has very distinct
restrictions which we would like to avoid for the stock market.
It is interesting, however, just to add one final comment, that
very recently, within the past six months or a year, there have been
two or three new mutual funds which have expressed in their
prospectuses the philosophy-as a matter of fact, not just the philos-
ophy but a rigid limitation-that they will not grow beyond $100
million. That was the typical figure in at least two of these. The
management of these funds must have had some strong reasons for
picking that as the maximum to which that fund would be permitted
to grow.
So we have some interesting developments on the basis of the
free choices by individuals in the fund business.
17 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Special Study of Securities Markets, I-R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, 844 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Special St d, of Markets].
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Primary Responsibility of Fund Management
DR. IRWIN FRIEND: I would like to make the general comment
that the two positions expressed here are really not at all different
philosophically. I gather that both of you feel that the primary re-
sponsibility of the mutual fund management is to optimize the interests
of their own shareholders, and not to look out for the interests of the
stockholders in the portfolio companies. The only difference, it seems,
is a factual one as to whether mutual funds are or are not effectively
locked in.
If they are locked in-and I don't think that they are to any
considerable extent-their obligation would still be to maximize the
interests of their own stockholders, rather than of other stockholders
in portfolio companies. To the extent that there is any divergence
between the two, it seems perfectly clear where the responsibility of
fund management lies.
I was interested that no one here-and, I think, wisely, perhaps-
takes the position sometimes expressed, that, in view of fund size and
the impossibility of negotiating at arm's length, the mutual fund
management does have a broader responsibility for the other stock-
holders in portfolio companies.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I thought Dan leaned that way when he
said that when a fund is locked in it's got to exercise responsibility not
only with respect to its own shareholders, but also with respect to
the other shareholders.38
DR. FRIEND: But I think he also pointed out that there were
coincident interests. I think it would be useful to get his reaction
as to what fund management ought to do where the two interests are
not coincident.
PROFESSOR BAUM: I tried to limit my remarks. Funds already
are locked into some of the more important issues on the Big Board.
To the extent that this is so, the interests of fund shareholders merge
with those of the portfolio corporation's shareholders. Fund managers
ought to exercise responsibility in relation to the portfolio corporation
simply because they have a responsibility to their own shareholders.
However, even where the funds are not locked in, they ought to
exercise responsibility and judgment toward the corporations in which
18 See p. 675 supra.
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they hold stock; the funds are in the position, which they widely
advertise-at least through their salesmen-of obtaining information
concerning the operation of corporations in which they invest. The
funds tell us that they speak with management; they obtain opinions
from management; they obtain facts. In this regard I'm not talking
about the kind necessarily relating to a new ore deposit, but I am
talking about the plethora of detail that allow for the exercise of in-
formed judgment, the kind of facts that may not be found in the
published journals. Because the funds are in a position to obtain such
facts, they should assume some kind of obligation in relationship to
other shareholders.
I think that at this point I've moved far away from any com-
munity of interest that Fred and I might have had.
Pitfalls in Fund Influencing of Portfolio Management
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Is that right, Fred?
MR. BROWN: That is exactly right. All of us who manage
mutual funds work for the people who own the shares of those mutual
funds. Our job is to do a good job for them.
It seems to me that what Dan wants to do is to put us in the
position of being second guessers. We're to look over the shoulders
of American management and decide whether it is doing the right
thing.
Now I happen to think that we are not competent to do that
job. I don't believe that we are competent to pass judgment on
corporate matters of all kinds. I believe that if we attempt to do
this, we will get into the hottest water we have ever been in.
And let me say that there is an occupational hazard in
working for mutual funds. In a real sense, we live vicariously. We
visit and talk to management. We say: What are your problems?
What are you doing about them? How do you do this? How do
you do that? And if we are not careful, the first thing we know, we
begin to think, despite our inexperience, that we could run a business
better than its own executives run it. This is an attitude that we
have to watch very carefully, especially in our younger analysts.
If we begin to tell everybody how to run their businesses, I would
have some concern for the economy of the country.
PROFESSOR BAUM: Bob, may I just put in a very brief, youngish
kind of reply?
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I'd like to quote from a statement made by David Rockefeller in
1958.
I might . . . draw your attention to one important
change in savings that is occurring: namely, the tendency for
personal savings to flow more and more through institu-
tions-through insurance companies, pension funds, mutual
funds and the like-rather than through individual savings
accounts. During the sixties, corporations will find them-
selves dealing increasingly with these sophisticated investors.
Moreover, I suspect that such investors will become more
demanding of management as time moves on-that as hold-
ings expand, institutions, as well as individuals, will feel
obliged to take more active interest in seeing that corporations
do indeed have good managements. This will be true espe-
cially if their holdings become so large that they cannot
readily or quickly liquidate their investments, as is now their
practice when they become dissatisfied with the management
of a corporation in which they hold shares.'"
The Conglomerates
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Before moving more deeply into the
question of lock-in, which seems to hold the key to much of our
discussion-let me raise an additional problem relating to control of
portfolio companies. Do any of you see a problem of a different
magnitude when, for example, the investment adviser of a mutual
fund with large holdings in a brewing company, is also interested in a
maker of barrels used by brewers? I am thinking about the con-
glomerates. Various kinds of companies are now beginning to have
an interest in investment advisers, and in that way may be able to
exert some influence over the funds' portfolio companies. These port-
folio companies may have some business relations with the company
which owns the adviser.
COMMISSIONER WHEAT: Well, I suppose if you are speaking to
us at the Commission, naturally this and many other things are matters
of concern, and probably will continue to be, but we have not to date
noticed that this has become a problem which we can put a finger on.
We have, as you all know, some very careful controls in the
Investment Company Act on transactions involving a purchase or
sale or a loan or similar types of transactions between investment
company managers and the investment company, or the affiliates of
the investment company; perhaps these controls, which have proved
very workable for the last twenty-five years, may be sufficient in
this area."o
19 BAUAT & ST=S, supra note 8, at 80.
20 Investment Company Act § 17, 54 Stat 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964).
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THE GIANT MUTUAL FUND
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: If no one else has a comment on that
particular problem, let us turn to the problem of the large fund, be-
cause in many ways it poses the problem of portfolio mobility most
acutely. Indeed, the Commission's concern in that area was evidenced
by its conclusion that "there is no reason to believe that the share-
holders of the largest funds would benefit from further growth." 2"
I suppose after reading that, Bill Moses, the trustees of M.I.T.
and the Board of Directors of M.I.G.S. got together, and they have
now put a limit on the size of those funds.'
MR. WILLIAM B. MOSES: That's a fine question to start me off on.
On the contrary, the meetings that we have every week are de-
voted to thoughts of further growth of both funds and the offering
of all the benefits and advantages of size to not only our existing
shareholders, but to many more. In fact, Professor Mundheim's
question reminds me a little bit of something in the past.
A little over twenty-five years ago I left the confines of Wall
Street to join Massachusetts Investors Trust. It had just passed the
$100 million mark in size, the largest fund in the country, and my
friends, in wishing me well, said in awe-stricken tones: Do you realize
you are going to the largest fund in the United States? Just as if I
were going to work for General Motors or American Telephone or
Standard of New Jersey.
I arrived in Boston to find that M.I.T. had just fought the battle
of the Investment Act of 1940, in which there was an attempt, or a
serious discussion, to put a limit on size. I'm glad to say that wiser
counsel prevailed, and that limit was not put on.
But here we are today, twenty-five years later. Time has gone
by, and I'm standing here before you trying to defend once again the
advantages of size. To me it's ironic, and a little bit sad.
Comparative Performance of Giant Mutual Funds
The key conclusion that Professor Mundheim referred to is in
Chapter VI of the Mutual Fund Report, and I quote it: "There is no
reason to believe that the shareholders of the largest funds would
benefit from further growth."
Now, how did the Commission arrive at this conclusion?
21 SEC Mutual Fund Report 263.
22 The combined net assets of the Massachusetts Investors group as of June 30,
1966 were $3.019 billion. SEC Mutual Fund Report 48.
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A study of performance results indicated to them that the largest
funds, those in excess of $1 billion, did not show the superior perform-
ance that would be expected from the various advantages they
possessed just by virtue of their size: lower operating expense ratios,
lower portfolio turnover, and greater management resources.2
The reason for this, the Commission says, is that these advantages
apparently-and I stress the word "apparently," because that kind of
wording is throughout this chapter, if not throughout the report-
have been offset by a "lack of portfolio mobility and flexibility at-
tributable to their size," that is, attributable to the large size of the
holdings of the individual securities.
Therefore, the SEC concludes that since the performance of these
funds has not been enhanced by their growth, the funds will not
benefit from further growth. And, indeed, the Commission goes on
to say that if the growth of the largest funds should continue, the
point might be reached where portfolio mobility will be so seriously
impaired as to greatly affect the interests of shareholders. And they
say this is possible even without any further growth of mutual funds,
simply by virtue of the growth of all institutional investors, par-
ticularly the pension funds, all of whom are "contributing to the
growing problem of portfolio mobility." 25
Let us look at the Commission's basic premise: that the largest
funds have not had the superior performance that one would expect
from the advantage of size. This conclusion was based on a study
of performance for the five- and ten-year periods ending 1965, which
indicates that the average performance of the largest funds is no
better than the average performance of all funds in similar investment-
objective categories.
Here the Commission has, in my view, fallen into a common and
fundamental error, basing a conclusion on the results of a particular
and limited period of time. Anyone in our industry who has studied
performance knows that varying periods of time with different starting
points, will produce widely varying performance results. Let me give
you a few examples.
(1) The average performance of the five largest common stock
growth income funds (the M.I.T. type), all over $1 billion in size at
the end of 1965, was superior to the average performance of all funds
in the growth income category for the five ten-year periods ending
1965, 1964, 1963, 1962, and 1961.
28 SEC Mutual Fund Report 263.
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 254-57.
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(2) The average performance of the two largest growth funds
substantially exceeded the average performance of all growth funds
during these same ten-year periods.
(3) Only the two largest balanced funds performed no better
than the average for all balanced funds for the ten years ending 1965.
The inclusion of these two funds, one of the largest and the other the
third largest in the entire industry, in the Commission's analysis of big
fund performance, was an important factor leading to its conclusion.
However, in my opinion, not only do balanced funds represent a minor
part of the mutual fund industry, but performance comparisons are
less meaningful because of the varying proportions of common stock
held in any given period.
Now, let's look at M.I.T. alone, since it is the largest common
stock fund. It outperformed the group average in each of these five
ten-year periods except the last-the ten years ending 1965. The
reasons for that poor performance are clearly discernible and are in
no way related to portfolio mobility or flexibility. In addition, in a
group of twenty funds considered to be most similar to the Massa-
chusetts Investors Trust in policy and objectives, for each of the past
ten years ending in 1965, the Trust ranked in the upper half in all
but three, 1959, 1960, and 1965; and again the reasons for poor
performance had nothing to do with portfolio mobility and flexibility.
To sum up, the SEC's conclusion that the performance of the
largest funds is no better than that of all funds in similar investment-
objective categories is erroneous, as it is based on insufficient and
inconclusive data.
Portfolio Mobility and Flexibility
Now, presumably I could quit right here, having thrown out the
SEC's first premise, and we can go home. But the Commission also
contends that the mediocre performance, as they see it, of the largest
funds is apparently-again, apparently-due to a lack of portfolio
mobility and flexibility attributable to their size. Although I have
worked for over twenty-five years for the largest common stock fund
in the country, I have never found, and do not yet find, any demon-
strable correlation between portfolio mobility and flexibility, and
performance. The key factors affecting performance are, first and
foremost, the investment skill and judgment of the fund managers;
second, the investment policy of the fund; third, the relationship of
that policy to the economic environment during the period under
review; fourth, the industry diversification of the portfolio; and finally,
686 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of course, the actual selection of the individual securities, particularly
the major holdings.
However, let's forget for the moment any further debate about
the significance of performance results and the relationship of portfolio
flexibility to them, because it is obvious that the Commission and many
other observers of the mutual fund industry are concerned about port-
folio mobility-about the ability of the large funds to manage their
portfolios in any real sense.
This is an area that I can discuss only in the context of our own
experience, because, obviously, I'm not familiar with the inner work-
ings of the other large funds.
In the report the SEC states: "The special problems of managing
most large funds revolve mainly around the fact that they buy and
sell large blocks of securities." " Despite the size of the Trust, we
have never felt that we had any such problem. With few exceptions,
we always have bought freely and sold portfolio securities in the desired
amounts, large and small, within acceptable price ranges and reason-
able periods of time.
A major factor in our ability to maintain this mobility as we have
become larger has been the rapid development of so-called bloc trading
techniques, a development which has grown hand-in-hand with the
growth of the institutional investor. As a result, contrary to the
general impression and the impression of the SEC report, we are
more liquid today than we were five years ago.
The Commission goes on to say that large funds frequently have
difficulty in acquiring securities they desire at prices close to those
prevailing at the time the investment decision was made, and to
support this claim they cite a few horrendous examples. In fact, in
one example they use the phrase "albeit an extreme one," 27 which
gives me license, perhaps, to use some extreme ones too.
But let's look at the facts from our own experience. Last year,
1966, out of approximately seventy separate purchases voted by the
trustees, about 75 per cent were acquired at an average differential of
less than $2 a share from the price at the time of the trustees' vote.
Where larger spreads did exist, the majority were in our favor. This
is what one might expect in a declining market, but in 1965, a year
of a rising market, our experience was very similar.
Included in our 1966 purchases were eleven new additions, or
new names, ranking in size from $3 million to $14 million each. The
largest of these was 200,000 shares of Trans-World Airlines. The
first 100,000 were acquired at an average price of 83 2, over a sixteen-
26 Id. at 255.
27 SEC Mutual Fund Report 256.
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day period starting July 25. This price compares with a price of
85 at the time of the vote, and a range of 76 to 89 during the whole
period.
The second 100,000 shares were purchased over a thirteen-day
period starting September 22 at an average price of 563s, which com-
pares with a vote price of 63, and a range of 52 to 67.
I mention these transactions because I think they are very typical
of our operations and experience, and they indicate-to me, anyway-
that there is no such problem of mobility and flexibility.
The Commission expressed a similar concern about the ability
of the big funds to dispose of large blocs of securities. Again the
M.I.T. experience: out of approximately sixty-five votes to sell secu-
rities, over 70 per cent were disposed of at an average price within
$2, plus or minus, of the vote price. The number where a larger dif-
ferential existed were few and largely favored the fund. Included in
these sales were thirteen eliminations ranging all the way from $1
million in size to $14 million, and the largest one was the sale of
321,000 shares of Goodyear Tire & Rubber. The major part of this
holding, 226,000 shares, was disposed of over a fifteen-day period in
April at an average price of 45, which compares with a vote price of
44, and a range during this time of 42 to 48. The balance was sold
even more quickly at similar prices-again, a typical and normal
experience.
To further support its case, the SEC referred to the increasing use
of secondary distribution techniques by large funds and the higher
cost of these secondaries, as compared with normal market transactions
on the securities exchange.28 However, we have seldom found it
necessary to resort to the use of secondaries, primarily because the
normal channels of distribution are adequate for our purpose. For
example, the Trust had only three secondaries in 1966, and none in
1965. In fact, I think the most we have had in any year has been six.
We did not have any in 1963 or in 1965.
Perhaps our experience is not typical of other large funds, but
it seems to me that the Commission is overlooking the real significance
to the stockholder of specific investment transactions such as sec-
ondaries or any large bloc trades. The shareholder is interested in
how the investment decision ultimately works out, rather than
whether the transaction costs x times more than if it had been
processed some other way. One example should suffice.
In 1961, the Trust attracted some attention by selling at a price
of 40 about $30 million of a well-known steel stock through a sec-
28Ibid.
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ondary, the largest transaction of its kind up to that time. The Trust
netted $38.50, the difference representing a cost of 3.75 per cent or
- about 3.8 times the regular stock exchange commission. However,
since 1961, that company drastically reduced its dividend (with a
partial restoration recently) and the stock is still selling today for
less than what we received five-and-a-half years ago.
Future Prospects for the Giant Fund
Now, should our stockholders complain about the cost of that
transaction? And what does it mean to us as managers? Today,
with only twelve stocks out of 106 issues exceeding $31 million in
size, it indicates to us that under normal market conditions we can
dispose of virtually any holding without significant cost or market
impact.
To summarize, in our opinion, based primarily on our own
experience, the Commission has not justified its conclusion that the
shareholders of the largest funds will not benefit from further growth.
Portfolio mobility and flexibility does not present the problem en-
visaged by the Commission. Immobility, to the extent that it may
exist, at any given time, is not a factor affecting investment perform-
ance, and the Commission's conclusions are not supported by adequate
and comprehensive performance data. As a matter of fact, their con..
clusion should read: there is no reason to believe that the shareholders
of the largest funds will not benefit from further growth.
Now, how will they benefit from further growth? They will
continue to have all the benefits of large size. I don't have to spell
them out. They are in the report.2 9 But they include lower expense
ratio, lower portfolio turnover, and greater management resources,
together with satisfactory and, on balance, above average performance,
unaffected by any spectre of portfolio immobility and inflexibility.
In closing, I would like to comment briefly on the Commission's
fear that growth of all institutional investors, particularly the pension
funds, might reach the point where it could very seriously impair the
flexibility of the mutual funds. I think all of us, including the Com-
mission, should assume that this growth will continue. We should
look on it as a normal, healthy development, in keeping with the
growth of the economy, rather than something to be frightened of.
Instead of trying to inhibit this growth, as many of the changes asked
for in this report would do, instead of talking about the possible need
for maximum size limitations, the Commission should devote its
energies and talents to assisting the national securities exchanges, the
29SEC Mutiua Fund Report 263.
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institutional investors, and, indeed, the entire financial community to
meet and cope successfully with challenges of this growth.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Thank you, Bill.
THE PERFORMANcE FUND
This picture of the large funds with relatively low turnover having
been drawn, it seems appropriate now to hear from Bob Doran who
will comment on what has been called the performance fund. News-
paper articles talk about the performance fund as one that tries to
capitalize on short-term market trends.
I think Ivest Fund is normally thought of as a performance fund,
and I'd like to hear your comments, Bob, on whether or not the
performance fund is a different kind of fund. Does it represent a
new attitude on the part of investment managers? And perhaps you
can also direct your attention to this problem of portfolio mobility.
MR. ROBERT DORAN: Not only do I represent the small fund, but
in the words of Mr. Brown, I'm also a young analyst.
Definition
I have been asked to address myself to the subject of performance
funds: the concepts behind them, their operating procedures, and
their impact on our financial system. If my comments help to raise
the level of understanding on this very much misunderstood phenom-
enon, I will have achieved my objective.
Performance literally means the doing of something, fulfilling a
wish, accomplishing an objective, attaining a goal. Although it is
often assumed to be its own qualifier, implying success, performance
must be qualified with such words as "good," "bad," or "indifferent."
To date, the phrase "performance fund" has been used in its most
restrictive sense. It is obviously easier to measure the performance
of a fund whose objective is limited to, for example, capital apprecia-
tion than that of a fund whose objective is general, for example, con-
servation of capital with reasonable income. As a result, the term
"performance fund" has been incorrectly used to categorize a small
group of capital appreciation funds whose recent gains in per share
value have attracted widespread investor notice and new investor
money.
I suggest to you that the term "performance fund" as presently
used is a misnomer and needs clarification. In my opinion, a perform-
ance fund is any fund which achieves its stated objective and, in com-
petition with funds having truly comparable objectives and policies,
achieves relatively superior results over a reasonable period of time.
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Let's examine this definition more closely. It revolves around
four basic premises:
First, performance applied to a mutual fund is a measurement
of how successfully the fund achieves what it sets out to do.
Second, this measurement is precise. It can be tabulated defini-
tively at any point in time to cover any duration of time.
Third, this measurement is relative. It must be related to the
stated goal of the fund. When two or more funds are compared, their
goals must be comparable. Although all funds must stand the test of
comparison, discretion should be exercised to avoid comparing apples
and oranges.
Fourth, performance must be evaluated over a period of time.
It should be self-evident that, the longer the time period, the more
meaningful the evaluation.
No discussion of performance would be complete without mention
of the qualitative aspects of performance, of achievement. Once the
quantitative results are tabulated, one might rightfully want to know
more about the character of the performance; for instance, how is
the record of achievement accomplished? What degree of risk was
assumed to achieve the goal? The answers to such questions in no
way diminish the quantitative results, but they might help to put these
results in somewhat better perspective.
Performance and the awareness of it should not be considered a
fad, fashion, or vogue. It pervades not only our industry, but busi-
ness universally. The pressure to improve performance is a direct
result of a quickening pace of competition. As the mutual fund in-
dustry becomes increasingly competitive-and of this we can all be
certain-better informed investors will increase their demands for
excellence. The rewards for superior performance will be those of
success. The penalties for inferior performance will be those of
failure.
Performance, then, is an integral part of our business. It is
basic to our existence, our continuing growth and our ultimate sur-
vival. As Thackeray put it, "Next to excellence is the appreciation
of it."
Operating Procedures
Let us turn our attention to a discussion of the operating pro-
cedures of performance funds. The methods and policies used at
Ivest may or may not be similar to those used at other funds. There-
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fore, I can only speak for our fund, and my comments in no way
represent the attitudes or values of our competitors.
The elements of successful fund management can be separated
into three groups: First, the organization itself; second, the portfolio
policies; and third, the philosophy of management which pervades both.
A contemporary mutual fund organization depends upon manage-
ment and communications. Management is the heart and soul of any
organization. It is imperative that only the most competent minds be
hired for analytical and portfolio management work. There is no sub-
stitute for investment talent.
These money managers must understand the goal and be properly
motivated to obtain it. Since money management is a highly indi-
vidualistic art, an atmosphere conducive to creativity and individualism
must be established.
In conjunction with this, management must be effectively com-
pensated, with significant monetary rewards, but, more importantly,
with freedom, authority, and responsibility.
It should be noted that management can reach optimum effective-
ness only when equipped with the best tools available. This includes
an up-to-date knowledge of the most contemporary methods of both
fundamental and technical analysis.
There is a Spanish maxim which states: What the fool does in
the end, the wise man does in the beginning. Timing in today's
dynamic investment arena is vital; and so we must concern ourselves
with the process of communication within our organizations. In-
formation must be gathered, sifted, and evaluated immediately. Par-
ticular priority must be given to processing negative information.
Delays in time in evaluating such information can be extremely costly.
Sources of information must be continually checked, assessed, and
updated.
There is a trend toward the creation of total in-house research
capability. Such capability reduces the firm's dependence on outside
sources and ultimately offers optimum control over investment results.
The time required for the decision-making process must be con-
stantly reduced. If committees prove cumbersome, they must be
replaced. The most effective means must be employed to streamline
communication and decision making.
The second element of successful fund management relates to the
actual portfolio policies practiced by the firm. The variance in the
policy views is considerable, but the policies at Ivest are as follows:
First, relative concentration. This results in a sharper focus on
companies of particular interest. A policy of selectivity leads to
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greater control over the portfolio and, among other things, helps to
avoid overstaying in a deteriorating situation.
Second, relative marketability. A fund must be able to establish
and eliminate positions in the shortest possible time period with the
least impact on the price of the stock. We at Ivest have always had
an interest in the Most Active List, which usually gives a day-to-day
closeup of current trends. Looked at in the proper perspective, this
can be very revealing.
Third, relative quality. If you can achieve superior performance
with well-timed decisions in quality securities, you will have achieved
the qualitative performance referred to earlier. This is the ultimate
mark of professionalism to which many of us aspire and which very
few of us attain.
Fourth, relative activity. We live in a world where change is the
one certainty, a world where there is a running historical struggle
between the comforts of the status quo and the continuous pressures
for change. It is absolutely imperative that management be sensitive
to change In so far as activity reflects this sensitivity for the
serious and well-considered efforts of management to attain its objec-
tives for its shareholders, we regard such activity not only as acceptable
but as an integral part of our obligation.
Perhaps the words of T. H. Huxley best express the attitude of
Ivest's management toward activity: "The great end of life is not
knowledge, but action."
Philosophy of Management
The single most important element for successful fund manage-
ment is the philosophy of management, which concerns the beliefs,
concepts, and attitudes of the management group. Time does not
permit me to comment on all of these, but no discussion of perform-
ance would be complete without the mention of certain fundamental
philosophies.
Of paramount importance is the concept of flexibility. The
sensitivity to change mentioned earlier is the cornerstone to successful
investing. Of equal importance to the performance-oriented investor
is a profound belief in innovation. Management must demonstrate the
willingness to try the untried, and must continuously develop the most
contemporary methods and procedures to do the job.
Something that is very helpful to our group is the recognition that
ours is a fallible art. Realistically, we must be prepared to make
mistakes, to profit from them, and then to forget them.
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I believe it is safe to say that all performance funds have an
understood philosophy of industriousness. Performance can be equated
with hard work.
Lastly, we have a fundamental belief in the individual and in
the continuity of management. Our policy, reduced to its simplest
terms, can be stated in this way: Hire men more intelligent than you
are, and then people more intelligent than they.
We will not know the total impact of the increasing performance
orientation of our industry on our financial system for some time.
Many, many questions might properly be raised. Answers to them
at this juncture must be conjecture.
For instance, can we in the fund business anticipate that the
individual will be given more freedom and responsibility in decision-
making? If so, what are the implications for all of us in our con-
tinuing search for the best investment talent? Can we look forward
to stronger, deeper, and more independent internal research organiza-
tions? Will we be forced to utilize new technological innovations to
remain competitive? Is it fair to assume that those firms which
achieve excellence will some day dominate our business? Is the trend
toward the institutionalization of wealth merely in its infant stages?
These are questions that we fund men must at the very least
ask, and try to answer.
Will our portfolio policies stress greater or less concentration,
higher or lower turnover? It is interesting that in 1962 the turnover
rate for open-end funds was 14.7 per cent, and only 10 per cent of the
thirty largest common stock funds out-performed the Standard &
Poor's 500. Can we draw any conclusions from the fact that in
1966, when the turnover rose to 29.9 per cent, some 94 per cent
out-performed this yardstick? Turnover per se certainly does not
create performance, but dare we say it has hurt performance?
Will the awareness of differences in performance among mutual
funds affect our nation's banks, with their vast trust departments?
Can they train and develop money managers, endow them with the
needed spirit of freedom and personal involvement, and motivate them
sufficiently? If not, can they maintain their present dominance as
managers of retirement trusts? Some banks have already asked
themselves these questions. Many others apparently have not.
And the impact on the brokerage community--what ramifications
are there for this group? Will today's volume of business lull them
into complacency, or will the recent development of certain funds
joining regional exchanges jolt them into a new competitive posture?
Will they develop the necessary skills in bloc trading which must be
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developed to serve the requirements for the increasingly institutional-
ized and performance-oriented money? Will the in-house research
depth of the funds disrupt growth patterns of the so-called research
brokerage firms? If so, how will this affect the rise of new firms in
this already crowded area? Brokerage firms should turn the attention
of their best analysts to these questions.
If answers to some of these questions asked earlier are conjecture,
how can we evaluate all of these in their impact on the securities
markets? As events are known faster, interpreted by more capable
people, evaluated immediately, and so forth, should we not anticipate
that the price pendulum will swing in shorter, more volatile cycles?
If so, the main effect of performance funds may prove in the long
run to be a stabilizing one, leaving securities markets less sensitive
to daily trading and more reflective of long-term economic and
international trends.
In conclusion, I find that performance funds are any funds which
are obtaining their objectives, be they capital growth, preservation, or
current income. It is evident that operating procedures of con-
temporary managers, though they vary considerably, are undergoing
rapid change. I have been fairly specific about the procedures our
management group uses to achieve its goal, without in any way
implying that these are procedures others should adopt.
And, finally, I believe that performance and the great emphasis
on performance stems from more active competition for increasingly
knowledgeable investor money. A combination of investor demand
for excellence on the one hand and management's response by im-
proving performance on the other would and will result in enhanced
shareholder benefits. Ultimately, the term "performance fund" will
have no meaning, because there simply won't be any other kind.
PROFESSOR MUNDEEIM: I am very interested in the relative
precision of your definition of "performance," Bob, because it suggests
to me that perhaps we can begin to identify the categories of funds more
precisely, measure their performance, and then perhaps the SEC can
make those results available, so that the investor can very clearly and
sharply differentiate between funds and know which one to buy and
where he gets the most for his money. Is that what you were leading
up to?
MR. DORAN: I didn't think I was suggesting quite that, but it
would be good for investment objectives to be defined as precisely
as possible. You might properly address that question to the gentle-
men from the SEC.
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PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I thought they'd probably want to hire
you as a consultant, notwithstanding.
Frank, did you want to comment on that?
COMMISSIONER WHEAT: Bob said he thought of addressing that
to me, and I said, "Please don't!"
Correlation of Portfolio Turnover and Perfornance
DR. FRIEND: I have one question of Mr. Doran, and a comment
on Mr. Moses' statement. Maybe I ought to take the question first.
What was that statement about the performance of mutual funds
in 1966?
MR. DoRAN: It was the turnover rate-I don't have the table
right in front of me-but with a turnover rate of approximately 14.7
per cent in 1962, only 10 per cent of the thirty largest common stock
funds out-performed the Standard & Poor's 500; and then in 1966,
with a turnover rate of 29.9 per cent, 94 per cent of those same thirty
funds had out-performed the same Standard & Poor's 500.
DR. FRIEND: Don't you have a very pronounced bias in the
direction of your results? You take a year like 1962, where the
market was extremely weak. Your funds flow in, and as a result you
have cash, which obviously does much better in a declining market.
In 1966 you have the same result, but, I suppose, vastly intensified by
your much greater inflow.
MR. DORAN: Actually, the 1962 market and the 1966 market
were not all that different. I think both periods showed a definite
trend maintaining the increase in the turnover percentages that have
been increasing year by year; and also there was an accompanying
increase in the percentage of these thirty funds that out-performed
the Standard & Poor's. But I felt that 1966 and 1962 were fairly
similar kinds of markets. As a matter of fact, I know I felt they looked
the same to me. I didn't enjoy either one of them.
DR. FRIEND: I thought the 1966 market was one where you
had a vastly greater inflow of new money into the funds, as compared
with 1962. This may explain the results to some extent. Also, I
suppose even common stock funds are not fully invested in common
stock equities.
MR. DORAN: Well, they vary. Usually they are not 100 per cent.
DR. FRIEND: I must confess that there are two things that bother
me about your remarks. One is the statement, which I had not heard
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before, that the common stock funds in 1966 had so greatly out-
performed the market. That bothered me a little bit more than the
turnover implication in your remarks.
I think we have to make two kinds of adjustments: first, for
that proportion of your portfolio which is not in common stocks, and
second, for the lag in the inflow of your funds, in this case in a
declining market. In the studies that we carried out, we generally
found that all funds, including common stock funds, tended to do
better than the market when the market was going down, and tended
to do worse than the market when the market was going up.
MR. DORAN: Of course, in both of these years you had a little
bit of everything. You had periods when nothing was happening.
You had periods of sharp decline. You had periods of sharp rally.
And for the most part, when we are talking about the thirty largest
common stock funds, for all intents and purposes we are talking about
an average of 95 plus per cent invested positions in common stocks, and
I think it is valid to use those.
As far as new inflow of money is concerned, you know, you have
to decide what to do with that money, and I would say that the inflow
into these thirty funds was handled very differently. Some funds
probably kept investing on the way down all the time; others may
have waited and then invested the accumulated cash within a short
period of time. I don't know. But I'm not sure that's a relevant
factor either.
DR. FRIEND: However, the Wharton School's Study of Mutual
Funds indicated that for the period 1953-58, mutual funds, as com-
pared to the market, did relatively better in periods of declining prices
than they did in periods of rising prices0 ° Now, I'm not in a position
to say what has happened since that time. You may have data which
I don't have.
Comparative Performance of Giant Mutual Funds
There is one issue raised by Mr. Moses, which I would also like
to comment on. He presented some data indicating that the larger
funds did better than the market as a whole, which presumably means
better than other funds as well. I'm not in a position to question the
data, since I haven't seen them, but I must say that it is inconsistent
with some data which have been published, covering not quite as long
a time period, which seems to show quite different results. And
30 Wharton Report 295.
MUTUAL FUNDS AS INVESTORS
since these results have been published, I would like to refer you
to them.
The first was the analysis of performance over the 1953-58
period included in the Mutual Fund Study by the Wharton School.
Relating performance to size of fund, we found a sort of inverted
U-shape type of effect as you went up in size. Initially, performance
seemed to be somewhat better; then as you kept going up, perform-
ance turned worse, though the largest funds still did, as I recall, some-
what better than the very smallest funds.3
I might add that we also did this for common stock funds sep-
arately, so that's not the issue.
Three qualifications should be pointed out. First, it is not clear
that the differences are statistically significant. Second, once you
adjust the differences in portfolio risk, you eliminate a high proportion
of these differences, particularly as I recall, the differences between
the medium and the larger size funds. Then, finally, another possible
explanation for this rather surprising finding-namely, that perform-
ance-wise the largest funds did not do better over this period than the
medium size funds-might reflect the lack of flexibility of such funds.
By lack of flexibility, we did not mean-as Mr. Moses seems to
feel the SEC report meant-that they couldn't dispose of large hold-
ings. We meant, first, that the bargain has to be very big to be
profitable for a large fund; second, something which is a bargain for
one thousand shares may not be a bargain if you have to buy 100,000
shares. The price can very well be driven up in the process.
32
Let me say that we were not sure that lack of flexibility was an
important factor. Interestingly enough, initially, we got the hypothesis
from some friends in Wall Street.
Now in terms of additional studies, a colleague of mine, Professor
Vickers, and I published an article in the Journal of Finance about a
year ago which carried some of our earlier results to the end of 1963
on a much less comprehensive basis. Here, we found that the largest
funds had a lower average return than the smallest funds, but, at least
to some extent, this may have reflected less risk in the portfolio of the
largest funds.3 We didn't particularly distinguish the largest five
funds. We had all size groups represented. Thus, for the 1953-63
period there are published results not yet controverted as to their
factual accuracy which seem to be a little inconsistent with the findings
31 Id. at 309.
32 Friend, Romance vs. Statistics in the Stock Market, AmmuCAN STATISTICAL
ASSOCIATION 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ]BUSINESS AND EcoNOMIC STATISTICS SECTION
178, 183.
33 Friend & Vickers, Portfolio Selection and Investment Performance, 20 J. Fl-
NANCE 391, 401, 408 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Friend & Vickers].
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reported here by Mr. Moses. Now, it may very well be that some-
thing has happened since 1963 which changes the picture, in which
case I would say it's a rather short time to come to any very definite
conclusions.
So that I don't end up on an unnecessarily controversial note, I
would like to point out that neither the Wharton School report nor
the SEC study, as I interpret it, are recommending any legislation to
limit the size of mutual funds.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Dan?
PROFESSOR BAUM: In this regard I would like to make two
points. One is about the SEC's report itself.
It's a report that attempts to deal with-let us use this term
loosely-wrongs as they have been found to exist. It spots certain
danger signs. Yet the report says: Let's wait. Let's wait and see
whether these danger signs ripen into a "wrong," and then we'll deal
with them. We'll come forward with recommendations at that time.
This is an interesting attitude. From my point of view, it is a most
conservative attitude. It's an attitude that doesn't attempt to take
prophylactic action. And in this regard I think the report is deficient.
Let me make a point about fund flexibility and mobility. The
report is directed toward mutual funds; and yet in a very real way, it's
very difficult to talk about mutual funds without talking about all other
institutional investors. Institutional investors are highly concentrated.
The report tells us that eight advisory organizations control about
half of the assets of the mutual fund industry.34 The report also tells
us, I believe, that twenty banks control approximately half of all non-
insured private pension funds0 5 To the extent that this is true,
to the extent that there is an institutionalization of the market, to the
extent that the floating supply of stock is sponged up by these institu-
tions, there must be a problem for institutional investors in getting in
and out of particular stocks, despite the examples given by Mr. Moses.
Now, the point might very well be that they shouldn't get in and
out; that once they buy in, to a greater or lesser extent, they ought to
stay in for long-term investment.
Application of Performance Fund Principles to the Giant Fund
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Let me take your comment, Dan, and
use it as a basis for a question to Bob Doran. When you talked
about relative concentration, selectivity of stocks, relative marketability
34 SEC Mutual Fund Report 301.
35 Ibid.
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and sensitivity to change as guiding principles of your investment
policy, you were talking from the vantage point of a $60 million
fund. What about those principles when applied to a billion-dollar
or $2 billion fund? Will they still work? Can the huge funds do
the things which you suggest a good mutual fund management ought
to be able to do today?
MR. DORAN: Well, Bob, I broke down my discussion about pro-
cedures into three segments; one related to organization, another re-
lated to the actual policy practiced by the fund, and the third related
to philosophical elements.
Regardless of size, our management would have the same basic
philosophical approach toward money management; we will have the
same attitudes and values that we have built up about organization,
specifically, that you have got to have good people, that you have got
to have smooth communications and so forth. In the portfolio policy
area, the key word-and I used it for each one of the four points that
I explained-is the word "relative": relative concentration, relative
marketability, relative activity and relative size, all relative to the
position of competitors with comparable size and so forth.
I'm very tempted, frankly, to answer a very serious question with
one word, by merely saying: relatively. Yes, we would expect to use
very similar policies to those we use today, even if Ivest Fund were
a billion dollar fund. I think it would be naive to suggest that there
wouldn't be some change in the actual procedures that we follow; but
if you bear in mind the word "relative," I think we should pursue
our present policies regardless of our size.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I thought that was precisely Dan's
point-it becomes relatively more difficult to operate as the funds
get larger.
Another way to get at the question of portfolio mobility is to
ask: What can the markets handle? Walter Frank is a man who
handles a lot of these institutional transactions. Walter, can you
talk a little bit about how the exchange market has geared itself to
handle the demands which institutional trading makes, and perhaps
comment on the strains which we always hear are being placed on
the auction market by these institutional developments.
THE EXCHANGE MARKET AND THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSACTION
MR. FRANK: I was happy to learn at the beginning of this session
that each one is here as an individual, and that I'm not here as an
official of the Exchange, that I'm here as an individual specialist.
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Some years ago I don't think a specialist was ever invited anywhere.
I think we have come a long way.
The development and growth of mutual funds has certainly had
an impact on our markets. In the broad, over-all appraisal of market
activity and the funds' participation in that activity, it is reasonable
to conclude that the infusion of nearly $40 billion into the securities
market has had an effect on prices. The presence of this tremendous
amount of capital seeking employment has most likely forced investors
of all types to set standards for share ownership that are somewhat
different than might be set if these $40 billion were not present in the
market; but it is impossible to determine the exact degree of impact
or percentage difference in price structure caused by these funds, and
I see nothing detrimental in their presence. On the other hand, I feel
very strongly that they have had an over-all beneficial effect on our
market by bringing to it additional liquidity and strength.
Dramatic Examples of Portfolio Liquidations and Acquisitions
In the long run the impact of fund presence should not pose in-
soluable problems. However, there have been many comments offered
as to short-term or immediate impact of sizable fund acquisition or
liquidation. Instances of large, quickly developed and quickly com-
pleted programs of liquidation which have been dramatic and exciting,
forcing monetary price changes of 5 to 15 per cent, have caused great
concern among some critics. But let us examine a few of these
instances and study their effect.
I made a few notes on some of the more exciting transactions
that have occurred in the recent twelve months. I think of an instance
where a fund entered the market in Motorola when it closed at 184,
and created enough selling pressure so that it opened at 175, down
some 5 per cent. Thereafter it quickly went down to 159.
I recall another experience with Motorola where the stock had
closed at 134, and late in the afternoon pressure generated by two
funds contributed to the decline to 119.
I remember another instance involving Xerox, where funds
entered the market with what was about 100,000 shares of stock when
it was selling at 210, and caused a momentary suspension in trading.
When trade reopened, the price was 201, down some 5 per cent.
Finally, I recall a recent occurrence where a bloc of 300,000
shares of Montgomery Ward was sold at 19Y2, previous price activity
having been around the 212 or 22 level; that represented a 10
or 12 per cent change. In another case over half a million shares
of Monsanto were liquidated at a price of 37, when previous activity
had the stock in the 41 or 42 range.
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Well, these are dramatic. They are exciting. They can be
upsetting to some people. But to suggest that the fund shareholders
were damaged is to offer an opinion without complete examination of
the facts. We must think of the end results of these transactions.
I'm certain that the funds which chose to participate in any of
these liquidations had sound reasons for their decisions. It's possible
that they had immediate use for the funds in other investments which
seemed more attractive than the one which they were willing to sell
at a 10 per cent discount.
As far as the impact of the decline on other public shareholders-
and I have got to think of the market place for all investors-it had
little or no impact on anyone who wished to sell shares. Those who
wished to buy were offered an opportunity to do so at a price sub-
stantially below the previous price level of recent activity. Forty
years ago, such a decline might have had a great impact on those who
wished to sell. In those days we had margin accounts in which the
customers carried a lot of stock on very little margin, and an abrupt
change in price might have precipitated selling from that type of ac-
count. Since that situation no longer exists, the risk of forcing
liquidation by dramatic price movement is no longer with us.
I want to speak about the other side too, because there has been
a comment about the problem of acquisition. I recall a time when a
fund came in and wanted to know where they could buy 25,000 shares
of Litton. The price of the stock was 912. They completed their
purchase at 94Y2, thus paying a 4 or 5 per cent premium for the
acquisition. They later sold at well above a hundred.
I also remember the time when a fund went into Xerox while it
was selling at $250 a share. Their tremendous demand forced the
price of the stock up some 10 or 12 per cent, to a completion of the
order at $280. At the time it seemed like a rather strong, vigorous
move, and it seemed extreme to pay that much extra. That same fund
was party to a transaction later at 201, which after adjustment for
splits, was the equivalent of $1,005 a share.
So I want to make sure you understand that liquidation at a
price removed from recent price activity, or acquisition at a price
removed from previous price activity, can very well be a sound invest-
ment decision and certainly can be very rewarding to those who
are involved.
These transactions were all in the auction market, but in addition
to the auction market we have established procedures for bloc dis-
tributions. The most popular ones are secondary distributions and
exchange distributions, and through them we think we have provided
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vehicles for liquidations that would have a minimal effect on the
price structure of the security.
So I welcome the mutual funds' participation in our market place,
and I look forward to many years of their active participation and im-
pact. At the risk of being coupled with Frank Wheat's Duke of
Cambridge," I would say that I see no industry problems ahead that
cannot be resolved without changes in our market procedures. I'm
certain that fund programs of acquisition and liquidation can be and
will be properly taken care of.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: You say, "without changes in our
market procedures." What changes in market procedures do you
have in mind?
MR. FRANK: The changes in market procedures? I was referring
to the suggestions that there might be limitations on acquisitions or
liquidations by funds or possible price limits such as have been insti-
tuted in the commodities markets. I wasn't speaking to specific
recommendations, but to the vague suggestion that because of the
size of fund participation in the market, some type of regulation
should be developed.
THE THIRD MARKET AND THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSACTION
PROFESSOR MUNDIEIM: To complete the picture of the ability of
the markets to handle institutional transactions, we ought to talk a
little bit about the Third Market and the contributions it makes.
MR. FRANK WEEDEN: I pricked up my ears when I heard "Third
Market." What little success our firm has had is probably due to
the fact that we have no opinions at all. And this is the last place
I'd want to get out of character in that respect.
The Third Market, as I conceive it, is designed to move securities
very efficiently from one customer to another, provided that the
customer knows what he wants to do and doesn't need any help in
making up his mind. That is only part of the service that the Stock
Exchange members perform. We do various types of business with
professional customers. We have no individual business, and, as I
understand it, no one else in the Third Market is interested in the
public or individual business, but only the institutional business.
36 See p. 671 s=pra.
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The institutional investors are only a part of the total stock
market. The public make up maybe two-thirds and the institutions
about one-third. But, the institutionalization of the market is cer-
tainly in progress.
We have various types of markets. We have markets where
there are adjustments from one industry to another. One mutual
fund sells, and it's divided up among a number of other institutions,
such as bank trust funds, pension funds and other similar accounts.
That's not very much of a problem. But I have seen some markets
where all the professionals want to sit on the sidelines or all want to
sell at the same time. Then somebody has to unload all of those stocks
on the public, and we may have pretty violent fluctuations in the
market. Now, keeping in character, I don't want to say that fluctua-
tions are good or bad, or give an opinion about the desirability of
stabilizing the market. My point is that if all institutional investors
arrive at the same opinion, you have a serious problem. It's different
when one institution is buying steels and another selling them.
I was interested especially in some of the comments that have
been made during the day. I marked down on a piece of paper here
"locked in," and have my own opinion on it. My friend to the left,
Mr. Doran, wrote "true" and a question mark. I interpret that to
mean that he didn't think the funds are locked in, except in the very
unusual case where they bought a stock that they usually don't buy. I
don't think this is a problem at the present time, and I don't see it
arising in the immediate future.
However, I think I might differ a little with Mr. Moses, who
gave, to me at least, the impression that he could get more for a big
bloc than he could for a small bloc. I'm not inclined to agree with
that. I think that if you have 100,000 shares of stock to sell, you
have to take a discount from the current market price, and I think it
usually varies from a point to a point and a half. If you have 25,000
shares, you may have to shave the price three-quarters of a point,
possibly a full point. If you have 5,000 shares, it can probably be
negotiated at just under the last sale-maybe a little bit more.
There is another point involved here that I think we should keep
in mind. If one fund is selling 100,000 shares of stock, and they
reduce the price two points, it gives another fund a chance to buy that
stock two points under the market. Afterwards the purchaser can
say: "Well, I bought 100,000 shares of stock, and I beat the market."
But he had to wait until somebody took the initiative on the other
side of the picture.
If somebody is buying stock, it gives the seller who is attracted
by the distortion in the buying order an opportunity to come in and
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unload a little bit higher; that's probably where Mr. Moses came in
and got an extra good price.
That's the way the ball bounces. But I would say, as a general
rule, you have to pay a little bit more to buy a big bloc, or take a
little more loss to sell one, than you would for a small amount.
I think that Mr. Frank and I met for the first time today, and we
decided that we were going to be very good friends, and that we
weren't going to get our necks out, or get into any fights with each
other. He is primarily in the auction market, but he did say that they
also had up their sleeve, if necessary, a negotiated market. Our
market is all negotiated, and we don't have an auction market up our
sleeve at all.
MR. FRANK: Seats are available for $230,000.
MR. WEEDEN: I think on that I will withdraw, and think about it.
I don't think we are at the point where at the present time the
mutual funds really have any great trouble in moving their portfolios
and I don't think they are going to for a little while. But it's like the
story we have out in California: what's going to happen to the people
on relief when the last taxpayer dies?
If the market becomes 100 per cent institutionalized, and there is
no public any more, then we may have some different problems.
AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF THE MARKET
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: A number of panelists seem to foresee
more fluctuations in market prices-and more rapid fluctuations.
Irwin, from your point of view as an economist, will this disturb the
efficiency of the market?
DR. FRIEND: Bob, I think I will address myself to a little wider
perspective than that, but I will answer your question in the course of
my comments.
Mutual Fund Impact on Stock Prices
Generally I'm in accord with the SEC's conclusions in the part
of the report dealing with mutual fund impact on stock prices.
Specifically, I agree that (1) "the evidence available at this time with
respect to the consequences of the institutionalization of the investment
process does not point to a need for major new legislation"; (2) there
is a need for a "re-examination of existing market mechanisms and
rules necessitated by these changes"; and (3) these changes require
"fuller data concerning the security holdings and trading patterns of
[Vo1.115:669
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institutional investors than has heretofore been available," with the
gap in such data greatest for pension funds.
37
The Commission does not take any position on the economic
implications of the long-term upward pressure on stock prices exerted
by mutual funds and other institutional investors over the post-war
period, or on the stabilizing or destabilizing implications of their inter-
mediate-term trading activity. My own view is that the long-term
upward pressure on stock prices probably has been socially desirable,
tending to eliminate some of the substantial disparity between long-run
returns on stock and fixed interest bearing obligations, and that on
the whole mutual funds have not added significantly to intermediate-
term instability of the market.
The Problem of Mass Redemptions
The Commission's concern with the danger of mass redemption
of fund shares in a sharp market decline seems to me to have relatively
little basis. Such redemption not only did not occur during the 1962
or 1966 declines, but seems inconsistent with the historical trading
pattern of small investors. I think many of us, including some of our
friends on Wall Street, have a rather erroneous view of what the small
investor is like. If we look either at the odd lot trading balances since
the turn of the century or at the net purchase balances of investment
company investors since the 'twenties, there is an indication that this
group is perhaps the most stabilizing in the market, in the sense that
they are more inclined to purchase than to sell in periods of market
weakness. This pattern might be reversed if investors who can ill-
afford equity investments are persuaded by uninhibited industry selling
practices to make mass purchases of mutual fund shares. I trust that
this is not a real danger at the present juncture.
Mutual Fund Impact on Stock Price Fluctuations
The Commission's main concern in this part of the report is
indicated by these excerpts:
To the extent that irregular and relatively infrequent
transactions in sizable blocs of securities by large institutional
investors become more significant and orders from small
investors become less significant, the markets for individual
securities become more susceptible to wide and erratic price
fluctuations. . . . In some respects the market impact of
mutual fund activity is even more significant than that of
other institutional investors because mutual funds have higher
portfolio turnover rates than other institutional investors
and because much of the capital of the funds comes to them
from people who, but for the funds, would have invested in
37SEC Mutual Fund Report 302-03.
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securities directly for their own accounts. Hence the growth
of the funds tends to substitute the decisions of a few pro-
fessional managers with respect to massive blocs of securities
for the decisions of large numbers of individual investors."
The Commission does not adduce any evidence to indicate either
that the markets for individual securities have in fact become more
volatile, or even if they have, that this is undesirable in the sense of
increasing disparities between market price and intrinsic value. It is
not clear, for example, that a market which is subject to greater short-
run fluctuations as a result of response to an improved flow of informa-
tion is worse than a less informed market which is more stable in the
short run. Nor is it clear that the market which is the ultimate in
stability in the long run as well as short run is to be preferred to a
more volatile market which more accurately anticipates the future
earnings flow.
Similarly, it is not at all clear that the substitution of the decision
of a relatively small number of professional advisers for a larger
number of individual investors is undesirable from the viewpoint of
optimal markets. Hopefully, the Commission will explore further
both the statistical facts and their economic implications.
The Growing Importance of the Nonauction Market
In this connection, the Commission seems to recognize that a non-
auction market may be preferable to an auction market for the dis-
position of large blocs of securities, and that it is more important to
remove institutional restrictions on effective competition in these
markets than to channel activity to a particular market. Large blocs
might flow to the "Third Market" or other "over-the-counter" markets
basically for two reasons: the institutionally prescribed absence of
quantity discounts on exchanges, or the intrinsically greater efficiency
of the nonauction markets for such transactions.3 9 To the extent that
this development reflects the first influence, hopefully competitive
forces, aided and abetted by the Commission if necessary, will remove
it. To the extent that it reflects the second influence, the development
is a healthy one.
There are, of course, certain dangers associated with an increased
flow of transactions to over-the-counter markets, but these, it seems to
me, can largely be avoided by improving the information flow on
transactions in such markets.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FUND PORTFOLIO TURNOVER
Finally, it might be pointed out that the SEC's report devotes
less attention than might have been warranted to the problem of sub-
38Id. at 26.
-3 See id. at 302.
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stantially increased fund portfolio turnover rates. Portfolio turnover
in mutual funds has increased greatly, and in the first three quarters
of 1966, amounted to close to twice the nonmember turnover in the
market as a whole even if the fund turnover is adjusted, as it should
be, for the net sale of fund shares. Such adjusted fund turnover is
about four times the estimated stock turnover rate of pension funds
(a group of institutional investors with which the mutual funds might
be compared) and roughly three times the stock turnover rate for
odd-lot public investors (the group in the market most comparable to
the purchasers of mutual fund shares).
There is evidence, both in the Wharton School Study of Mutual
Funds and in a recent paper in the Journal of Finance by Douglas
Vickers and myself, that there is no significant correlation between
fund turnover and performance. The Friend-Vickers paper indicates
that in the brief period tested, even in the absence of turnover costs,
funds as a whole would have done fully as well if they had held onto
the stocks they sold as they did by turning over their portfolios. 4°
Moreover, turnover is not costless, since it amounts to not quite one
per cent of the value of transactions.
It has been asserted and there is evidence that at least in the past
couple of years-a period not covered by the Wharton School Study
or by the Friend-Vickers paper-a number of mutual funds have
been more successful in carrying on concentrated purchases of selected
securities which they sell once the market has responded appropriately.
There is, to my knowledge, no relevant published evidence for the
industry as a whole. The evidence given this morning is what I would
call ad hoc empiricism. However, the Friend-Vickers paper does
show that for the three years tested-1958, 1959 and 1962-in one
year, 1958, stock purchased by mutual funds did behave somewhat
better than other stocks; but it is interesting to note that in subsequent
years such stocks behaved worse than the market, so that by 1963, the
1958 mutual fund favorites had not performed as well as the market
as a whole.4 The evidence is quite tenuous, but it could be argued
that the activity of mutual funds, plus some kind of follow-the-leader
market vogue, might have been responsible for pushing the price of
favored stocks to a higher than warranted level.
In any case, it is clear that there is no published evidence that
high portfolio turnover has paid off for the mutual fund shareholders.
There is some evidence that the shareholders may have suffered to a
minor extent, but this evidence is not at all convincing. However,
40 Friend & Vickers 404.
41 Id. at 397.
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in view of the major potential conflicts of interest between shareholder
and management interests associated with fund turnover, the question
may legitimately be raised whether the current trend to higher turn-
over ratios can be justified.
It is admittedly difficult to see what the SEC can or should do
to curtail turnover without interfering with legitimate management
prerogatives. Perhaps a minimal step would be to initiate fuller dis-
closure in this area, so that fund holders are informed of the fund
turnover ratio in contrast with selected norms, and informed of the
subsequent relative performance of the issues sold and purchased.
Performance Comparison of Mutual Funds and Pension Funds
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: There are a lot of points in that talk.
Which one of you wants to talk to them first? Bob?
MR. DORAN: One specific thing was comparing the activities of
mutual funds with the activities of pension funds, and the implication
was that turnover was some four times that of the pension funds.
Can I raise a very naive question: to what extent does the low
turnover in pension funds reflect the-well, how can I describe it-
the inactivity of managment people who have control over these assets?
For instance, it would occur to me that with the freedom from
tax burden enjoyed by pension funds, their turnover ought to be
considerably higher than that of mutual funds. In other words, to
what extent do your figures merely reflect the fact that pension funds
have been very badly managed?
DR. FRIEND: First of all, let me be the first to bemoan the fact
that we don't have adequate data on the performance of pension funds.
I might add that there is a Ph.D. dissertation covering either six or
seven pension funds, a pathetically small number, which suggests that
this group-the only group that could be handled this way-did
precisely the same as the stock market average; but this is the only
evidence that I know of.42
In this connection I might comment on one question submitted
from the floor. It reads: "A recent story in The New York Times
quoted a leading actuary of New York in connection with pension
fund investment considerations for the Air Line Pilots Association.
The conclusion of the actuary was that of approximately 20 bank- and
insurance company-managed pension funds studied over a long period
of time, only two of these bank- and insurance company-managed
42 Deitz, Evaluating the Investment Performance of Non-Insured Pension Funds,
1965 (unpublished dissertation in Columbia University Library).
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funds did as well as M.I.T. or the Dow Jones Industrial Averages.
What are your comments?"
Now, this is a larger sample than the one available in the Ph.D.
study. My guess would be that they are comparing the performance
of the pension funds as a whole, including the bond part of their port-
folio, which typically may be about 50 per cent of the total portfolio,
with the performance of a stock fund and a stock average. If this in
fact was done, it produces an inappropriate measure. Under such an
approach, you inevitably find that the institutions involved did less
well than the stock market averages in a period of rapidly rising
stock prices.
I might note that the Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds,
which for this purpose covered only the period 1953-1958, revealed
that only 13 per cent of the mutual funds did better than the averages
if you did not adjust for the composition of the portfolio.43 Many
of these would be common stock funds, so it's not at all surprising
to find only 10 per cent of the pension funds did better, when you
make no such adjustment, particularly since you have relatively few
pure common stock pension funds.
Correlation of Portfolio Turnover and Performance
To turn back to Mr. Doran, I am not against portfolio turnover
if it has a payoff. I'm simply saying that the evidence-what I would
call research type of evidence-so far does not indicate a payoff.
When you take each individual fund, look at its portfolio turnover over
the period 1953-63, and compute the correlation between turnover and
performance, there is no indication of payoff in this data.
And then, finally, as I pointed out, in the very limited experiment
which we carried out in the article I referred to earlier, we got the
rather amusing result that the stocks sold did slightly better than the
stocks purchased. Now, I'll admit that this last experiment covers all
of one year, which is a pathetically small time interval.
You may recall that the one recommendation that I made was
simply further disclosure in this area, and I'm perfectly happy to have
funds churn-and I use the word in no invidious sense-if there is
a payoff.
Relation Between Exchange Market and Third Market
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Because Walter has a train to catch, can
I let Walter make a comment now?
MR. FRANK: I decided that I would take the minutes left before
I have to leave, and then no one can rebut anything I say right now.
43 Wharton Report 297.
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I'm not in the fund business, so I may not have the same bias
that others might be charged with, but I have a particular problem
with accepting statistical data. To me it's after the fact. It's filed
under "S"-should have done. I think it's so easy to examine any
performance in life, whether it has to do with mutual fund turnover
activity or any other type of activity, and say after it's all over: it
would have been better if you had done something else.
I think to base your opinion on what would have been is a very,
very poor base from which to start, and I think that you have to
realize that turnover is a management decision, and there is no assur-
ance of success. At the moment you make the decision, it's a manage-
ment decision all the way, and to sit and second-guess those who have
the responsibility, I think is unwise.
Dr. Friend also mentioned the use of the Third Market. Here I
have a bias, but I won't push it at the moment. I think if there ever
were one central market for all securities transactions, it would have
to be the best; but to suggest that you ought to lean toward one
market or the other, because you think it might generally be better,
is a poor approach. As much as I compete with the Third Market,
I would suggest that when the Third Market offers a better vehicle
for your acquisition and liquidation, use it; but don't broadly general-
ize, and suggest that you should go to one all the time or the other
all the time, or that institutions should lean one way or the other.
I think that generalizations, including this one, are false.
The Spectre of Mass Redemptions
Mass redemptions and the problems created thereby have been a
major fear for all of us in the securities business for many, many years.
I think the only thing that could cause mass redemptions is something
that hasn't occurred since 1930, 1931, and 1932. I don't think the
investor, small or large, can depend on his own judgment of security
value when he's faced with serious crises in his own financial position;
that the little man who is out of work and has to sell whatever he has
in order to raise funds to live doesn't approach his problem from the
point of view of the sound investor. That's the only threat I see in
mass redemptions. I hope the day of mass redemptions never comes,
but I have great faith that if it does come, we'll be able to survive
and come out in fine fashion.
DR. FRIEND: I would prefer to answer before he leaves.
MR. FRANK: That's where we differ.
DR. FRIEND: First, let me say that I'm glad to hear that turnover
is one of the areas where Mr. Frank does not have any bias.
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Turning to his subsequent comments, I really didn't understand
his first and apparently major point, that it is not desirable to look
at a situation retrospectively. You know, there is a saying that people
who can't learn from history probably can't learn at all. I don't know
exactly how you do learn, except from precisely the kind of retro-
spective study that we at the Wharton School made, and that the
Commission has attempted to make.
It's true that history is by no means static. It may very well be,
for example, that performance of funds has improved tremendously
relative to the market since the last year covered in the studies with
which I am familiar, but these are matters to be determined by factual
inquiry, not by supposition, and I must say that I feel very strongly
about this notion that you shouldn't try to second-guess.
It's perfectly clear that management has to have responsibility for
making a decision as of that time, and no one should take over that
responsibility from them. It seems to me equally clear that responsible
judgment would dictate that where these management actions are
important for the economy as a whole, they should be looked at retro-
spectively from the point of view of learning something from them.
Now, I'm not sure whether the next point that Mr. Frank made
was addressed to me or not. He seemed to be implying, I thought,
that I indicated that institutions should perhaps go to the Third
Market-
MR. FRANK: I thought that was what you stated.
DR. FRIEND: Absolutely not!
MR. FRANK: I thought you had stated that they possibly should
seek other markets. Then I'm incorrect in saying-
DR. FRIEND: No, I said I believed-and I gather you do also-
in competition between markets.
Now, finally-this is a trivial point-Mr. Frank seemed to take
exception to my remark, which was inconsistent with Wall Street lore,
that the small investor is a reasonably stable sort of guy and is not
too likely to get caught up in the mass hysteria that the more specu-
lative elements of the community frequently get caught up in. He
talked about the fact that we have not had such a period since the
early 'thirties. I think it's only fair to point out that the largest odd-
lot buying balance in history, to my knowledge, took place precisely in
the early 'thirties.
MR. FRANK: They couldn't afford to buy in round lots.
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The Need for More Data About Portfolio Turnover
MR. MosEs: The differences in point of view between Dr. Friend
and me with respect to performance also apply to the significance of
portfolio turnover, but it seems to me that what is needed are more
adequate studies over longer periods of time and in greater depth. We
have done some studies on the effect, or lack of effect, of turnover on
our own funds and also on some of our competition. These studies
show that if there had been no turnover, everyone would still have
done all right; but the portfolio activity improved performance sub-
stantially. On the other hand, I suppose there could be some periods
where the reverse took place.
Incidentally, the same problem arises with respect to performance.
Analyses of performance barely scratch the surface. I would like to
see more work in this area.
Portfolio turnover can be affected in many peculiar ways. In
1966 someone else took my place as head of our Research Department,
and our turnover increased substantially. And another time we in-
creased our Research Department by 50 per cent, and for some reason
our turnover increased substantially. You can draw your own
conclusions.
While I have the floor, I want to get back to our performance
figures. I nowhere attempted to make any particular correlation be-
tween large and small funds. What I merely tried to challenge was
the statement in the report that the largest funds did not have the
superior performance one would have expected, that they did no
better than the average. Most of the evidence I have shows that they
did better than the average.
Can I keep the floor for one minute to comment on the question
of whether a fund such as Bob Doran's can keep up the high perform-
ance it has achieved when it reaches the billion-dollar mark? Let me
remind you of the size of Dreyfus Fund and the size of Fidelity Trend.
Although I hate to mention competitors, their records support some
conclusions that seem contrary to the general impression.
MR. BROWN: I want to follow up on what Bill just said concern-
ing studies that all of us, probably, are making of turnover.
We have found in our own case that the computer is a very useful
device for taking the kind of look at ourselves that we were never able
to take before, simply because it was such a task.
We have instituted what we call the management audit. The
purpose of this management audit is to do somewhat the same thing
Dr. Friend had in mind: to look backwards, to check ourselves to
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see if the decisions we're making are correct, and to see if we can
discover what factors have caused us to make mistakes.
We have found in a number of cases that the conclusions that we
have reached are not necessarily correct. They vary in degree from
what we are finding out as we make the very close and detailed
examination that the computer permits, but they nevertheless do vary,
and I'm sure that there is an opportunity for all of us to learn in
this turnover area and in the area of decision-making. I think this
will be one place where there will be progress in mutual fund manage-
ment in the future as a consequence of the availability of electronic data
processing equipment.
Relation of Reciprocal Business to Portfolio Turnover
COMMISSIONER WHEAT: Bob, I don't have any comment or
pertinent observations, except perhaps in one respect.
Obviously, one of the things the SEC has been concerned with
is the fact that heavy turnover of portfolios of listed securities does
raise a problem that comes from the fact that the turnover of listed
securities gives fund managers a vehicle for directed give-ups, cash
give-ups, to those who are selling fund shares, as an added incentive
to the sale of fund shares.
What concerns us, as we watch these statistics, is whether the
turnover has been generated by decisions that the turnover will benefit
the fund, whether the turnover results from basically uninfluenced
investment decisions, or whether the turnover in part has been in-
fluenced by a desire to make available sums of money through the
give-up procedure to aid in stimulating fund sales.
We do not as yet have any statistical evidence which would lead
us to believe that the rapid increase in fund turnover has been gen-
erated to any substantial degree by the problem I mention. But,
obviously, it's our job to keep an eye on this. In this respect it's
important to note that turnover of over-the-counter stocks does not
give the fund managers an opportunity to utilize give-ups, whereas
turnover of listed stocks does.
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Listening to all of you, I realize that the
turnover problem must ultimately be measured against performance.
We have come back to the point touched briefly earlier: what's being
done and what can be done to erect some standards so that investors
(and regulators) can measure performance in some uniform way, and,
thus, make judgments about different fund shares, either from an
investing or regulatory point of view?
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PROFESSOR BAUM: Before you can measure performance, it may
be necessary to look at the basic structure of the mutual fund. Let us
asume, that to some extent the high turnover rate is motivated because
of the give-ups which can be generated. To the extent that this is
true, it might be reasonably necessary to ask-and the report really
didn't do this-whether the structure of the mutual fund is such
that it has the capacity to yield the best possible performance. Only
after you have established a structure that can be efficient will it be
possible to look toward the possibility of creating standards or
guidelines.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Irwin, do you have a comment on the
possibility of erecting usable standards for measuring performance?
DR. FRIEND: In my earlier comments I indicated the nature of
my own bias, which is to try to handle this through disclosure. It is
so difficult to set up standards which would not interfere with legiti-
mate management prerogatives, that I would much prefer to see an
attempt made to handle this through disclosure mechanisms. The
obvious one is to have a little box that shows the turnover of the fund
in question, properly adjusted for net inflow, vis-A.-vis other funds and
the market as a whole. Also, if the Commission considers this to be
a significant enough problem-and I am beginning to think it is-it
might require use of a standard form which, while minimizing the
work involved, would give an indication of what performance would
have been had the securities sold been held, vis-a-vis the actual
performance attained.
I think that I would not go any farther than this.
PROFESSOR MUNDHIEIM: I guess that's far enough for some
people.
MR. BROWN: Bob, how do you really construct standards of
performance that will be meaningful when the final answer to an
investment in a mutual fund is whether or not that fund has done
what the investor wanted it to do for him?
You can get all kinds of classifications of funds, develop all kinds
of standards, and still not have provided the individual investor with
the answer. Unfortunately, when we get into this performance ques-
tion, the bias is in the direction of capital gains. I don't think the
mutual fund industry-and I'm talking about the entire industry-
is exclusively in, let's say, the horse racing business. Many of us
are really trying to run what some might call a livery stable. We are
trying to provide financial services, and to invest for people as they
desire over a period of years. The needs of the individual investor,
his temperament, his ability to take risks, his desires, his objectives,
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count very heavily in judging whether a fund has performed well for
him and met his needs. And, furthermore, the length of time that an
investor holds his shares is a very important consideration from his
point of view in measuring performance.
I think that if we reach a point where we have set global standards
determined by the SEC or somebody else, and every investor is regi-
mented into making up his mind according to what's supposed to be
good for him, we are going to find that a lot of investors have been
misguided by the standards and have taken on investments which they
should not have. For example, I am still old-fashioned enough to
believe, the so-called performance funds notwithstanding, that gain
distributions are not a proper substitute for income dividends for the
investor who needs income.
PROFESSOR BAUM: You talk about investors in terms of what
they want. This raises a whole series of questions in terms of the
kinds of people being attracted to mutual funds; it forces comment
on the selling technique used by funds.
Without getting involved in any lengthy discussion, I have serious
reservations about the kinds of people that we are attracting to funds,
whether they should be sought out in the first instance, whether it's
in the best interests of some to go into a fund, and whether they are
in a position to judge whether it's in their best interests. I suppose
I would make reference to the contractual plan.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Let me assure you that we are going
to discuss that at length on Friday-all day-and we'll be able to get
into the merits of that. I would like to stay away for the time being
from the merits of that very important question.
MR. BROWN: But leaving aside the contractual plan, what's the
record of the people who have invested in mutual funds over a period
of years? Have they done badly? Have they had some measure of
protection against inflation? Have they received the benefits that the
funds offered?
It seems to me perfectly clear that they have.
Now, as to how good this record is, that is something else again.
You can argue about that as long as you want to-forever, really-but
I think it's very difficult to demonstrate that people who have bought
funds on the right basis-and I grant you there are many who have
not-in most instances have done better than they would have done
had they tried to invest for themselves.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Can I read a question from the floor
at this point? "Dr. Friend, should not performance comparisons be
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made between the fund and what an average individual investor has
done or could do ?"
DR. FRIEND: I think it is a fact that the type of comparison that
we did make in the Wharton Study, between the funds and the market
as a whole, and the comparison which we did not make because the
data were not available, between the performance of funds and that of
actual individual investors are both appropriate.
Now, we could not make the second type of comparison, and it's
a legitimate question to ask: What would we be likely to have found
if we could have made it?
Since the Wharton Study, I have carried out two studies in col-
laboration with colleagues of mine here at the University, and we
studied the performance of investors in different income groups for a
limited period of time.
It's perfectly clear that all income groups combined must essen-
tially do the same as the market as a whole, because they constitute
the market as a whole. So the real question is: do you get significant
differences between the performance of relatively low-income investors,
who are more likely to go into mutual funds, and the performance of
the higher-income investors?
The tentative answer in those two studies, which are both pub-
lished in the Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, is
that there is absolutely no evidence that the low-income investors do
any worse than the upper-income investors.'
Just so I don't leave you on that unhappy note, I do think that
the mutual fund industry has been very beneficial to low-income in-
vestors, since many of them would obviously not have gone into the
stock market at all. It is also true that those who would have gone
in directly would not have achieved the same degree of diversification
that they get through the mutual funds. So that, though on the
average individual investors would have done fully as well, they would
have had a much bigger dispersion around the same average result,
with unfortunate consequences for a significant group of investors.
Impact of the Funds Attracting New Equity Capital
MR. -WEEDEN: I noted that somebody said there was $40 billion
of new money that had come into the market because of mutual funds.
I just wanted to raise the question whether that was all new money
which would not have been invested in stocks by individuals if they
hadn't gone into mutual funds.
44 Friend & de Cani, Stock Market Experience of Different Investor Groups,
AzmERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION 1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS AND ECO-
NOMIC STATISTICS SEcr0N 44; Friend & Crocket, Characteristics of Stock Ozwnership,
1963 id. 146.
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If this is all money that would not have gone into the stock
market, then you have done a great service to the American people,
because you encouraged them to save their money. On the other
hand, if this is money that would have gone into the stock market
through the judgment of the individuals, counseled by members of
the stock exchanges, then you have changed the character of the
market. Instead of having a broad market with thousands and
thousands of individuals guided by brokers, buying and selling in an
auction market, you have concentrated this capital into professional
management-in large amounts-and you have developed a necessity
for a different technique of market handling.
I don't think that the auction market is able to handle very large
blocs purely on an auction basis; but they have supplemented that by
a negotiated technique related to the auction market, and we in the
Third Market have supplemented it with another type of negotiated
technique which must also be related to the prices set by the auction
market.
I don't think all this $40 billion is new money. I think occa-
sionally mutual fund salesmen go to somebody who has 50 shares of
General Motors, and say: Look, if the automobile business goes bad,
you're going to lose everything you've got. Now, why don't you
sell that and get into a well-managed, professionally-handled security,
and you will do better in the long run?
And I'm not here to say that they wouldn't. They probably
would. But then that 50 shares of General Motors stock is gradually
accumulated by a mutual fund, and we are limiting the number of
individuals guided by their brokers. I think, actually, as far as the
brokers selling mutual funds are concerned, they are gradually getting
themselves out of business in some respects, and they might make more
money in the long run doing more business with individuals, instead
of trying to get their individual customers into mutual funds.
I did want to point out that it was probably not all new money
that went into the mutual funds.
Dr. Friend, as usual, probably has the figures.
DR. FRIEND: We do have some relevant data, going back, in this
case, to the early 'sixties, but I have forgotten the exact proportion.
My recollection is that something around a half of the money probably
would not have gone into the market alternatively. This is, inci-
dentally, based on a survey of mutual fund customers.
45
Now, I'm not sure that all of the half which seems to have repre-
sented diversion from normal brokerage can be considered to have
45 SEC Special Study of Markets Ch. XI at 358.
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hurt the brokerage business, because a lot of people also indicated that
as a result of getting interested in the securities market through a
mutual fund, they not only bought the mutual fund but also bought
other stock. So it's rather misleading to use this half-half apportion-
ment for that particular purpose.
But as to the most fundamental point raised-whether the rapid
growth in mutual funds will result in so narrow a market as to
diminish some of its most desirable properties-I think in certain
respects this will happen, but in other respects there will be very
significant offsets.
As indicated in my earlier comments, it is far from clear that
the market will be a less perfect instrument simply because we have
fewer investors, if these investors are better informed.
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AND INSIDE INFORMATION
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Before we close this morning's session,
I want to give Fred Brown a chance to deal with a very difficult
problem involving institutional investors and their relations with
portfolio companies. The report didn't deal with this, but I thought
you might, nevertheless, be interested.
The problem relates to the ability of large investors to sit down
and talk with corporate officials about the corporation. On the one
hand, the effort to dig out as much information about a company
as possible is one of the things you buy when you pay for mutual
fund management; that is, you hope that they are doing this. On
the other hand, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in a recent speech before an American Management Asso-
ciation sponsored conference warned that serious questions of law
and propriety arise when institutional investors are able to obtain
from a company, because of their economic power or for other reasons,
information that is not available to other investors.46
I suppose the best chart for steering between the Scylla of not dig-
ging out enough information and the Charybdis of violating the pro-
hibitions against insider trading would be a precise definition of inside
information. I'm not asking you to provide us with that; but perhaps
you can suggest some guidelines for governing the conduct of insti-
tutional investors in the practice of gathering and using information.
MR. BROWN: Ladies and genltemen, I started to leave the hotel
room this morning to get the bus and found that I couldn't get the
door open. A maid finally let me out.
46 Address by Chairman Cohen, American Management Association, New York,
New York, Nov. 16, 1966.
MUTUAL FUNDS AS INVESTORS
On the way over in the bus, I read I was supposed to be second
on this morning's program. After I got here, Bob informed me that
I would be last.
Now he has given you a description of what I will talk about
that is a little different from what I prepared. There are bound
to be days like this, I guess.
I would like to talk about a bogeyman of the mutual fund business
that won't go away. I want to try to get before you a facet of what
those who worry and write about mutual funds like to call "The
Problem of Size." This is the presumed power of mutual funds to
extract inside information, or confidential information, from cor-
porations whose securities they own; and, to complete the thought
of those who worry about us, the presumed power of mutual funds to
take investment action on the basis of this information, thus gaining
an unfair advantage over other investors.
Before this program started this morning, Bob suggested that
each of us start by telling two jokes and singing a song. I'm not
going to do either. But if I did have to have a theme song, I think
it would be the song from "Porgy and Bess" with that line: "They
tell all the chillun the Devil's a villain, but it ain't necessarily so."
My subject, it seems to me, is more than a little like that old
question: "When did you stop beating your wife?" Do mutual funds
have the power ascribed to them? Has it been used? Has it been
abused?
My answer to these questions is: for the most part, no. We
have problems aplenty, but control over portfolio companies really is
not one of them. Those concerned with solutions to the problems
of mutual funds might profitably, as I suggested earlier today, spend
more time on whether and to what extent the problems do in fact
exist. And, let me add that if I am wrong, the problems apply to
all institutional investors, not to mutual funds alone. In fact, they
may be more serious for some of the other institutions than
they are for mutual funds. But, in any event, mutual funds should
not be flayed with problems, real or presumed, simply because the
funds happen to be subject to greater regulatory control than most
other institutional investors.
The Problem of Acquiring Information
I read an editorial the other day in a widely-circulated financial
magazine, and in it there was this line: "The necessity for top cor-
porate management to dance attendance on visitors from funds holding
large hunks of the corporation's securities is certainly understandable--
1967]
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but damned disturbing." This came as a surprise and a disappoint-
ment to my associates and me. We were surprised because we didn't
know the necessity existed. We were disappointed because we haven't
had the good fortune of late to encounter any dancing executives.
This editorial comment, lacking factual basis, is somewhat typical of
the statements which the power subject seems to generate too often.
Dan Baum and his co-author, Mr. Stiles, in their book, The
Silent Partners, have this to say:
"Inside information, the hint of things to come, becomes
a valued commodity to the institutions under constant pres-
sure to make productive use of the monies entrusted to them.
. . The ability to obtain such confidences is a char-
acteristic in which many institutions take pride; it demon-
strates their ability to perform. The basic unfairness to the
rest of the investing public is manifest when institutions
exercise their power to obtain what is essentially inside in-
formation and use that information to change their investment
position." "
Dan said a little earlier this morning that we advertise this
ability to obtain confidences.48  This threw me. I have never seen
such a claim on a tombstone ad of the type to which mutual funds
are restricted.
The Baum-Stiles statement seems to me to be quite a serious
charge, if it is true. But I say to you now, as I did last night at
dinner to Dan, this charge is not backed up by a single example of a
mutual fund having forced a portfolio company to reveal inside, or
confidential, information and having either used it or misused it.
This is true in his book, and it is also true of every writing that I
have ever seen on this power subject.
I think there is a reason why this is so-and I'm not about to
claim that no mutual fund has ever gotten hold of any inside, or con-
fidential, information and used it to advantage. I am sure this has
happened. The fact is, however, that the amount of inside information
that mutual funds can get by any means is grossly over-rated. The
fact is that the usefulness of inside information, even if we can get it,
is grossly over-rated.
More often than not our problem is to get past the corporate
financial relations people, who dispense the party line, so to speak,
and in to talk with top corporate management. When we succeed, it
usually is a waste of valuable time to pry for confidences. Our pur-
poses are much better served if we find out about plans and problems,
47 BAum & STILEs, supra note 8, at 36-37.
48 See p. 681 supra.
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if we can get grounding in the basics of the business and the factors
that influence them, if we can learn about competitive position and
forces, and if we can come away with some appraisal of and con-
viction as to management's ability and the likelihood of its doing a
good job. These are the things on which sound investment decisions
are based.
To be sure, we would like to get sales and earnings estimates, and
commitments on dividend policies. But if we are analysts, and not
just reporters, information of that type is taken for our guidance and
not as gospel.
The Problem of Evaluating Information
If we get inside information, our problem then is how to evaluate
it. If it's an earnings estimate, is the source chronically optimistic
or chronically pessimistic? How will the market value it when it
becomes generally known? Or, has the market already discounted
what we have been told? How many other people know about it?
How many people got there before we did?
Here we are dealing with sentiment, emotion and timing in the
market place, and believe me, the opportunity for error is great.
If, as Messrs. Baum and Stiles have written, mutual fund manage-
ments "demonstrate their ability to perform" by obtaining and relying
on inside information, then I simply say that we have picked a really
rough road to negotiate. In the early 'thirties, as a young analyst, I
managed to obtain detailed information on the monthly sales and
earnings of a leading growth company of that time. I thought I had
it made. Then as a new product was nearing introduction, the sales
of this company's most important established product turned down, and
earnings turned down, and pretty sharply, too. What to do about it?
To my everlasting regret, I said: sell. The new product was
announced, and the price of the stock soared. The decline in current
earnings was announced, and the market ignored it. We had been
duped out of a fine investment by inside information and a presumed
advantage over other investors. We later repurchased the stock at a
considerably higher price-presumably from some less well-informed
investors.
Inside information is difficult to handle. I think it's over-rated,
both as to the amount we get and its usefulness. It is not a sig-
nificant factor in the management of mutual funds.
When I thought about saying that, here today, I wondered
whether I might be out of touch with what might be going on in
the mutual fund industry. So, I checked with a number of friends
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in the mutual fund field, and I didn't find one who regarded inside
information as important in his operations. And, I did find one who
thought it more of a hindrance than a help.
The Ethical Problem
There is, I think, a higher level of ethics in this general area of
information gathering than might have been the case in earlier years.
Most managers, I think, would agree that access to privileged informa-
tion tends to tie their hands. I think we have an awareness of the
interest of regulators, as referred to by Bob, in this whole area. I
think this interest has a prophylactic effect on us, and makes us very
conscious that if we get involved in the area, we had better be careful.
The pitfalls and entanglements are obvious, and, as a practical matter,
they loom large in relation to advantages that might be gained by the
use of inside information.
Many mutual funds, like other investing institutions, devote much
time and effort to field work: interviewing portfolio company manage-
ments, competitors, bankers, suppliers, customers and anyone else who
might be a source of information helpful to a profitable investment
decision. We stress this work. Dan Baum has said that we advertise
it, and, in a sense, maybe we do. He goes on, however, to say that we
seek and advertise that we get inside information. There he is wrong.
We seek basic information, both general and specific, that bears on
investment values. We try to do our jobs well, but we rely on ex-
perience and diligence and not on unfair advantage over other investors.
This seems obvious on the record, and the SEC seems to have seen
it that way. But, the bogeyman of power and control doesn't go away.
Looked at strictly from the standpoint of possible regulatory im-
plications, I would agree that problems exist if, through their field
work, funds are able to obtain from corporate management and act
to their advantage on information of immediate or shorter-term sig-
nificance that can be expected, when made public, to have a reasonably
predictable effect on the market price of a security. The Cady,
Roberts 49 case and that of a well-known mining company currently
in the news, provide examples. However, neither of these cases in-
volves a mutual fund, nor have any others of which I am aware.
I certainly think that corporate management has an obligation
to all stockholders not to disclose sensitive short-term information of
this nature, and I don't think, by and large, that those of us who go
out and talk with corporate management should try to do too much
49 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
50 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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digging or too much trapping for it. We don't need it to operate
mutual funds successfully. As a practical matter, we should avoid it
in order to avoid getting involved and tied down by it, and losing
our freedom to take action in the best interests of our portfolios and
our shareholders.
Perhaps other investing institutions have more problems in the
area of sensitive information than we in the mutual funds. Take,
for example, the case of a bank which has a large trust department,
handles many pension funds and the like, and which also is a large
lender of money to corporations. I haven't yet figured out whether
there is an "iron curtain" between the loan department and the trust
department that prevents some, let's say, cross-fertilization of informa-
tion. But I do think that exposure to problems of inside information
is much greater than in the institutional sector limited to mutual funds
alone.
Looking to the future, I don't think that we in the mutual fund
business have any real problem when it comes to gathering informa-
tion. It seems to me that we work very hard to try to find out all we
reasonably can about a company in which we are apt to invest or in
which we have invested. We are concerned with the intermediate and
longer-range future. I'm sure all of us here could give figures, but in
the case of the companies with which I am associated, we have a nice
little statistic which says that we interview ten different managements,
or hold ten management interviews, on the average, each working day
during the year.
This is a lot of management contacts. I'll admit that we have
exercised some power over the years, through our portfolio holdings,
in an effort to find out things which we think we reasonably can be
told which will influence the long-term position of companies and the
market action of their stocks. The value of such information to us,
or to any fund management, however, depends on an ability to
evaluate it. We don't ask for information on a private or restricted
basis. If such information means more to mutual fund managers, or
if they can put it to more effective use because of their experience and
continuing analytical work, they can hardly be said to be taking unfair
advantage of other investors.
But what has been the result of our efforts to secure information?
It seems to me to be perfectly obvious that through our efforts and
the efforts of other institutions, in general, the information made
available to the investing public has greatly improved. Investors have
become more sensible and sophisticated and the efficiency of the secu-
rities markets in directing the flow of capital to where it is needed and
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justified, has improved. Mutual funds are a strong force, even to the
extent that they may exercise power, in working in the direction of
fuller disclosure, and their interests, therefore, to a considerable degree
parallel those of the regulators. If all of this has helped to influence
security prices, corporations, in turn, have been forced to keep in-
vestors better informed.
The Special Problem of the Conglomerates
Having said all of this, I do think there is a somewhat new area
in the mutual fund field where perhaps this question of inside informa-
tion is a little more ticklish. I have in mind the conglomerate cor-
poration which was referred to earlier this morning and now has
entered our industry. I don't have in mind any suggestions for
regulation. On the contrary, I suspect that these conglomerate cor-
porations are very conscious of the possibility that they might secure
information from a competitor company that should not ordinarily
come to them, and I suspect they are very, very careful in this area.
The Need To Further Define the Problems
Perhaps there are regulatory problems and implications in the
mutual fund business that I don't know about or haven't recognized.
However, I don't see the presumed and imagined problems of power
and control over portfolio companies to be real problems. Ask cor-
porate executives if mutual funds control them-they are more likely
to agree that we pester them. And so, I agree with the SEC that
there is no need for new legislation to curb such power and control.
I think, as I said at the outset, that if the mutual fund industry has
problems, the problems themselves must be defined before the cure for
them is decided upon. We welcome the scrutiny of academicians and
others, but we hope for constructive suggestions for progress. We
just can't be left in the middle forever.
Take this issue of control over portfolio managements. On the
one hand, when funds say they would rather sell a stock than oppose
management, there is the concern that we are abdicating our re-
sponsibilities. On the other hand, when we vote "no" on management's
proposal, or when we try to influence a management decision, there is
concern that we are exerting too much influence.
Take the area of the influence of mutual funds on the liquidity
of the securities markets. On the one hand there is concern that
growth in the size of mutual funds and other institutional investors
may be causing a thinning of securities markets and reducing their
liquidity. On the other hand, statistics showing higher turnover for
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mutual funds than for other institutions create concern that there may
be too much trading activity by funds, and that they may be unduly
influencing short-term fluctuations in the markets.
Take the matter of investment information about which I have
talked today. On the one hand, it is sometimes said that mutual
funds only buy standard stocks, the inference being that the pro-
fessional manager is not fully earning his fee and is not giving the
kind of investment management which the public has been led to
expect of him. On the other hand, as we have discussed, concern is
expressed that the fund manager has been doing too good a job, has
been throwing his weight around too much, has been getting too much
inside information, and has been getting a manifestly unfair advantage
over the public.
If there are problems or regulatory implications in the role of
mutual funds as investors, they must be defined before they can be
solved or settled. If they cannot be defined, then they must be, as I
believe, more imaginary than real.
There is great risk in separating us as an industry too much,
pulling us too far away from the public. We are part of the public.
We represent the public. It is the public's money with which we are
dealing.
Free flow of information is needed for intelligent investment de-
cisions. It is as vital to all investors as it is to the mutual funds. It
is vital to the efficient functioning of securities markets. But its flow
is very sensitive.
The one thing I urge-the one thing I hope-is that neither the
professors, nor the regulators, nor anyone else will ever try to close
this highway, simply because there might be some bad drivers on it.
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